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North Korean and Chinese Joint Equity
Venture Laws: A Comparison
Chin Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and
China (the People's Republic of China) both belong to the family
of a socialist legal system which is based on the Marxist-Leninist
outlook toward law.' North Koreanization of Marxism-Leninism has
been conceptualized in "chuche self reliance thought." North Korean
thought is a cherished dream of a self-reliant national economic,
social, and political policy. 2 Meanwhile, Sinification of Marxism-
Leninism is Mao Zedong Thought, which is primarily based upon
Mao's teachings, with emphasis on such doctrines as universal ap-
plication of those teachings, the primacy of human will over mate-
rialism, love of manual labor, and devotion to the Communist party.3
Writings about the Chinese legal system in English are available.
4
However, the hermit policy undertaken by North Korea, since the
creation of the socialist state, has obscured a clear picture of the
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. LL.B., Korea University; M.C.L.,
George Washington University; M.S., Columbia University; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University.
1. As to the classificaton of legal systems and the identification of the socialist legal system,
see R. DAvm & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEoAL SYsTEMS N TEE WoRLa TODAY 26-27 (1985); K.
ZWEIGERT & H. K6oz, I AN INTRODUCnON TO COMPARATIVE LAw 293-352 (1977). A more
comprehensive analysis on the socialist legal system is made by Professor Christopher Osakwe in
M. GLaDON, H. GoED, ON & C. OsAXwE, COMPARATIVE LEAL TRADIION 672-714 (1985).
2. C. Kim, SE CrTED WmOs ONr A iAN LAW 488-91 (1982) [hereinafter SELECTED WRIT-
INGS].
3. Id. at 482-83.
4. Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1413 (1987) [hereinafter Kim,
The Modem Chinese Legal System]. As to the Chinese legal system, with specific reference to
business laws and practice, see Professor Alice Erhsoon Tay's analysis, which appears in CmNA
LAws FOR FoaEGN Busmmss 2-105 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
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North Korean legal system. Therefore, it is worthwhile to outline its
legal system, based on available sources.'
The 1972 Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea) uses the Chuche Thought of the Worker's Party
as its national ideology, being a localization or North Koreanization
of Marxism-Leninism to North Korean reality.6 The Chuche Thought
is being implemented by ideological, technical, and cultural revolu-
tions.7 One widely used unique method in the revolutionary processes
is the Taean method, which is a Chuche-oriented economic manage-
ment."
Under the 1972 Constitution, the unicameral Supreme People's
Assembly (S.P.A.) remains the highest organ of state power and is
the exclusive legislative body.9 A permanent standing committee is
provided to exercise supreme power in the S.P.A.'s absence. 10 How-
ever, the 1972 Constitution mandated the following structural changes
in North Korean government: 1) the investment of considerable power
in a newly-created Presidency;" 2) the creation of another government
unit, the Central People's Committee (the C.P.C.)12 (the highest
leadership organ of state power) to provide an institutional check on
the central state bureaucracy and to relieve the bureaucracy of policy-
making functions; 13 and 3) the elimination of an entire layer of
government at the local level and the institution of the local people's
committee, a control device similar to that employed at the central
level. 14
The 1972 Constitution has refined the structure and function of
the court and the procuratorate.'5 Further refinement of the court's
role was made in 1976, when the court organization law went through
5. C. Kim, KOGRAN LAw STuDY GUI-E 16-26, 80-88 (1987) [hereinafter SruDY GUmE].
6. SELacrm warnNGs, supia note 2, at 488.
7. S. CHO, LAW AND LEGAi LrxrEAruRE oF NoRTH KoREA 2 (1988).
8. Other methods include the Chongsan-ri method (management method of socialist economy
inspired by the top leadership) and the Chollima movement (state orchestrated production drive
as demonstrated by the mystic flying horse; "Chollima" means flying horse). As to the discussion
of the three methods, see SEacmrm Wmn6s, supra note 2, at 488-90.
9. Id. at 294-96.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 296.
12. The North Korean Constitiion designates the C.P.C. as the government's top policy
making organ. Headed by the President of North Korea, who nominates the other 24 Committee
members, the C.P.C. makes high-level policy decisions and supervises the State Administrative
Council (cabinet).
13. SacTanm Warn'Nos, supra note 2, at 297-98.
14. Id.
15. Srouiy GUIDE, supra note 5, at 19-26.
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its revision.1 6 One of the unique features of the 1972 Constitution is
the abolishment of the tax system as being "a hangover of the old
society."'
7
Laws, as used in the generic sense, adopted and issued by various
state organs pursuant to the 1972 Constitution, may be classified
into six categories. 8 Although it was reported in the 1970s that a
comprehensive codification project had been carried out in North
Korea, there is no official announcement regarding the outcome of
the project.' 9 However, an unofficial source indicates that the several
results were achieved. 20 First, extensive revisions of the Criminal
Code and the Criminal Procedure Code took place in 1974. The law
on court organization was also revised in 1976. Second, many new
codes were enacted including Law on Management of Socialist Prop-
erty, 1972; Law on Organization of Local Sovereign Organs, 1974;
Code of Civil Procedure, 1976; Land Code, 1977; Socialist Labor
Code, 1978; Law on People's Health Care, 1980; Provisional Civil
Regulations, 1982; and Enforcement Rules of Provisional Civil Re-
gulations, 1985.
On September 8, 1984, the North Korean Joint Venture Law (North
Korean JVL) was adopted by the Standing Committee of the S.P.A.
21
The law is designed to attract foreign capital and technology. 22 The
law consists of 26 articles, and covers such subjects as guiding
principles of joint ventures; organization of a joint venture company;
board of directors and business operations; audit and income distri-
bution; and dissolution of a joint venture company and settlement
of disputes.? This basic law was augmented on March 20, 1985 by
16. K.S. Kni, Cosm, MINsHusnuox J, an KYoWAKOKOu NO Km HOSET (CRalnNAL LEGnAl
SYsTm DEAlmNG wrrim CRBnxAL MArrms T HE DisOcRATrc PiEoPL's REUBUc OF KORE.A)
153-59 (1988).
17. SmaEcran WrrNGs, supra note 2, at 290, 490.
18. The categories are as follows: (1) laws, ordinances and decisions adopted by the S.P.A.
and decisions adopted by the Standing Committee of the S.P.A.; (2) presidential decrees; (3)
decrees and decisions adopted and directives issued by the Central People's Committee; (4) decisions
adopted and directives issued by the Administrative Council and directives issued by various
ministries; (5) decisions adopted by the local people's assembly, decisions adopted and directives
issued by the local people's committee and decisions adopted and directives issued by the local
administrative committee; (6) directives issued by the Central Court and the Procurator-General.
19. STuDY GumE, supra note 5, at 18.
20. Id.
21. Joint Venture Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Decision Number 10,
Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, adopted Sept. 8, 1984 [hereinafter North Korean JVL], translated in Kim, North Korean
Joint Venture Laws, 19 CAL. W. Ir'L L.J., 175, 205, app. I (1988-89) [hereinafter Kim].
22. Kim, supra note 21, at 177.
23. Id.
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an implementing statute entitled Detailed Regulations for the Joint
Venture Law (North Korean JVL Regulations).2 These two statutes
were augmented by two enactments: the Joint Venture Company
Income Tax Law25 and the Alien Income Tax Law. 26 These tax laws
were also accompanied by implementing regulations entitled Detailed
Regulations for the Joint Venture Company Income Tax Law27 and
Detailed Regulations for the Alien Income Tax Law. 28 These statutes
are expected to be supplemented in the future by a series of rules
and regulations to deal with specific problems.
In the People's Republic of China, the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment (Chinese JVL) was enacted in 1979 to accelerate the
introduction of foreign investment and technology. 29 This law, com-
monly known as the 1979 Sino-foreign Joint Equity Venture Law, is
implemented by the 1983 Regulations (Chinese JVL Regulations).
These implementing regulations are intended to cover unattended
issues under the 1979 basic statute? 0 These two statutes are being
supplemented by a series of rules and regulations to deal with specific
problems.
3 1
24. Detailed Regulations for the Joint Venture Law of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Decision Number 14, State Administrative Council, adopted Mar. 20, 1985 [hereinafter
North Korean JVL Regulations], translated in Kim, supra note 21, at 211, app. II.
25. Joint Venture Company Income Tax Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Decision Number 12, Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, adopted Mar. 7, 1985, translated in Kim, supra note 21, at 223, app.
III.
26. Alien Income Tax Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Decision Number
12, Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, adopted Mar. 7,
1985, translated in Kim, supra note 21, at 229, app. V.
27. Detailed Regulations for the Joint Venture Company Income Tax Law of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Decision Number 22, State Administrative Council, approved May
17, 1985, translated in Kim, supra note 21, at 225, app. IV.
28. Detailed Regulations for the Alien Income Tax Law of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, Decision Number 23, State Administrative Council, approved May 17, 1985, translated
in Kim, supra note 21, at 231, app. VI.
29. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, July 1, 1979,
promulgated July 8, 1979 [hereinafter Chinese JVL], reprinted and translated in CImA LAWS FOR
Folanso Busnmss 6-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
30. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State Council, Sept.
20, 1983 [hereinafter Chinese JVL Regulations], reprinted and translated in CH]NA LAWS FOR
FORGN Busmass 6-550 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). The implementing regulations, amended
since 1983, update the Chinese JVL.
31. It is reported that:
All in all, from 1979-1986, 95 laws and statutes were enacted by the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee. The highest organ of administration, the State
Council, issued over 400 economic regulations, while the people's congresses at the
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In addition to the statutes specifically dealing with Sino-foreign
joint equity ventures, there are two other important legislative pieces
that are concerned with foreign investment enterprises in China.
First, is the 1986 Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Enterprises with Solely Foreign Investment, 2 which is designed to
permit the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises where
capital is provided totally by the foreign enterprises. Second, is the
1988 Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-
operative Enterprises.3 3 This law appears to legalize already existing
foreign and domestic cooperative ventures by differentiating purely
domestic cooperative ventures and equity ventures.
34
One significant move undertaken by the Chinese government in
the area of foreign investment and the introduction of foreign tech-
nology is the adoption of the 1986 State Council Regulations Con-
cerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment (EFI Regulations)5.
3
The EFI Regulations are "formulated in order to improve the in-
vestment environment, to better absorb foreign investment, import
advanced technology, improve the quality of manufactured goods,
expand exports to earn foreign exchange and to develop the national
economy." 36 Export enterprises and technologically advanced enter-
provincial level and their standing committees had promulgated another 700. The earlier
arbitrariness and informality of political decision-making in these areas is thus being
replaced with a body of public law and regulations of growing complexity but accessible
to those affected.
CoNA LAws FOR FOREiGN BusiNm 2-145 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
32. The Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign
Investment, adopted by the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr. 11,
1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA LAws FOR FORIUGN BusmNs 13-506 (CCH Australia
Ltd. 1987). The 24 article law includes provisions on conditions guiding the establishment of the
solely foreign-funded enterprises. It covers the qualifications of juridical person, taxation, foreign
exchange, period of operation, labor unions, and protection of legitimate rights and interests. Id.
It is reported that there are more than 100 foreign-funded enterprises in China. As in the case of
the 1979 Sino-foreign Joint Venture Law, the law was again left intentionally vague by prescribing
only a skeletal framework to be supplemented later with detailed regulations. Some unanswered
questions include: (a) to what extent is general assistance in balancing foreign exchange to be
given to allow the marketing of products domestically; (b) what procedure or mechanism for
remittance of earned profits is to be used; (c) whether preferential treatment, such as the tax
holidays offered to joint ventures, will be available; (d) what is the term (allowable number of
years) of operation of foreign-funded enterprises; and (e) whether there are any industrial or
commercial branches in China that do not allow foreign enterprises.
33. Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-operative Enterprises, adopted
by the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, Apr. 13, 1988, reprinted and
translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FoRansai BusmFmss 6-100 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
34. Id.
35. State Council Regulations Concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated
by the State Council, Oct. 11, 1986 [hereinafter EFI Regulations], reprinted and translated in
CmNA LAws FOR FoauNo Busn;s 13-509 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
36. Id.
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prises designated under the 1986 EFI Regulations are to receive
preferential treatment over non-productive enterprises. 37 The treat-
ment extended to these designated enterprises includes offering means
to reduce production costs, relaxation of foreign exchange control,
managerial autonomy and elimination of certain bureaucratic red
tape.
38
Aiother significant legal infrastructure which protects foreign in-
vestment in general, and joint equity ventures in particular, appears
in Article 18 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution. 9 Article 18 stipulates
that:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other
foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest
in China and to enter into various forms of economic co-operation
with Chinese enterprises and other economic organizations in ac-
cordance with the law of the People's Republic of China.
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations
in China, as well as joint ventures with Chinese and foreign in-
vestment located in China, shall abide by the law of the People's
Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected
by the law of the People's Republic of China.40
While the North Korean JVL, with 26 articles, was made into law
in September 1984, and the North Korean JVL Regulations, with 71
articles, were adopted in March 1985, the Chinese JVL, with 15
articles, was enacted in July 1979, and the Chinese JVL Regulations,
with 118 articles, were adopted in September 1983. Chronologically
speaking, North Korean statutes on joint equity ventures are recent
innovations compared to their Chinese counterparts. However, there
has been a steady stream of legislative and executive acts passed in
37.. Id. at art. 2. Service industries are ineligible for certification under the 22 articles of the
EFI Regulations.
38. As to the discussion of the 22 articles of the EFI Regulations, see Yuging, Like Bamboo
Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on Sino-foreign Joint
Ventures, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 106-17 (1987) [hereinafter Yuging]. According to Article
3 of the newly adopted regulations encouraging foreign investment in the Shanghai Development
Zones by the Shanghai Muhicipal People's Congress, the Development Zones are to focus on
attracting foreign capital to develop new technology and new industries and on establishing
technologically advanced as well as export orientated enterprises. The preferential treatment includes
exemptions from local tax, exemptions from building tax, and/or a reduction of exemption from
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax. See CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN Busmss 91-070
(CCH Australia Ltd. 1987) (English text of regulations).
39. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 18, adopted by the Fifth Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, reprinted and translated in CtmA LAWS
FORFOREGN Butsm'ss 4-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
40. Id.
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China to augment the original laws and regulations. 41 The trend of
an active legislative program continues as of June 1989.
The purpose of this writing is to comprehend better the North
Korean joint equity venture laws by comparing them to their counter-
parts in Chinese law. Both North Korean and Chinese national
ideologies are based on Marxism and Leninism, under a centrally
planned socialist economy.42 Nevertheless, in the case of China there
has been an erosion of state-run economic policy in order to accom-
modate current state needs. 43 To what extent this trend will continue,
in spite of the June 1989 turmoil, is not the subject of this study.
Laws dealing with both countries are the basic source documents
which comparative law specialists consult in order to consider relevant
questions of similarity, difference, derivation, and deviation. For this
purpose, 10 essential elements of joint equity ventures that were
written in the North Korean statutes will be used as the basis of
comparison. These elements are: a) general principles and rules; b)
organization of joint venture companies; c) capital investment; d)
board of directors and management; e) purchase of materials and
sale of products; f) labor management; g) foreign exchange control;
h) audit and distribution; i) dissolution of a joint venture company;
and j) settlement of disputes. Each of these elements will be discussed
in light of Chinese legislative experience in the subject areas. Because
of their importance, two subject areas, organization of joint venture
companies and capital investment, will receive detailed analysis.
Whenever necessary, shortcomings of Chinese legislation will be
noted.
41. See Comment, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The Promised
Land is Not Yet in Sight for Foreign Investors, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. INT'L L. 257, 259-62 and n.
16 (1988) [hereinafter Comment]. For an inventory of the principal laws related to joint equity
ventures, see Cnu & DoNo, A CoarPi~ra GumE To FoRaEiN INvEnSM.NT IN CHnnA 249-57 (1987)
[hereinafter Cnu & DoNo].
42. Sm.EcaED WRriNos, supra note 2, at 480-91.
43. Kim, The Modem Chinese Legal System, supra note 4, at 1414, 1446-48. A recent
significant development on this subject is an amendment of Article 11 of the Chinese Constitution
on April 12, 1988. Amended Article 11 reads:
The individual economy of urban and rural working people, operated within the limits
prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects
the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The state guides, helps and
supervises the individual economy by exercising administrative control. The state permits
the private economy to exist and to develop within the limits prescribed by law. The
private economy is a complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects
the lawful rights and interests of the private economy and provides guidance, supervision
and control.
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 11, adopted by the Fifth Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, amended Apr. 12, 1988, reprinted and translated
in ChINA LAws FOR FOamoN Busrmmss 4-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
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Since this study is concerned solely with joint ventures, North
Korean tax statutes dealing with joint venture enterprises and aliens,"
Chinese law on enterprises which are 100% funded by foreign in-
vestment, 45 and Sino-foreign corporative foreign enterprises46 will not
be treated. However, the 1986 EFI Regulations will be used whenever
they are found to be relevant.
II. GENERAL PUNwciPLES AND RULES
North Korea and China have set out general principles and rules
to regulate the creation and operation of joint equity ventures. Five
topics are chosen to highlight fundamentals of North Korean and
Chinese joint equity venture legislation.
A. The Purpose of Desired Joint Ventures
The stated purpose of North Korean JVL is "to expand and
develop economic and technological interchange and cooperation with
many countries of the world." 47 To promote this purpose the North
Korean government "encourages joint ventures within its territory
between its companies and enterprises and foreign companies, enter-
prises and individuals, based on the principle of equality and reci-
procity. ' 4 Joint venture companies are expected to have "up-to-date
scientific technology to improve the quality of the products and the
ability to export." ' 49 Meanwhile, with a view to expanding interna-
tional economic cooperation and technological exchange, the Chinese
government "permits" the existence of equity joint ventures "to
promote the development of China's economy and the raising of
scientific and technological levels for the benefit of socialist modern-
ization." 50 Regardless of the use of the words "encourage" or
"permit," both countries take the position that a series of government
permissions are necessary to establish and operate joint equity ven-
tures, in order to harmonize the capitalistic approach to a nationally
controlled economy.
44. As to the English text of these statutes, including a discussion of the subject of North
Korean tax statutes affecting joint venture enterprises and aliens, see Kim, supra note 21, at 190-
201, 223-34.
45. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 1.
48. Id.
49. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 4.
50. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 1; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
3.
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The desired joint ventures in North Korea "may involve many
fields including industry, construction, transportation, scientific tech-
nology, and tourism."5 This desired listing was extended by JVL
Regulations to add broadly based industries, such as electronics and
automation industries, metallurgy, extraction, machine manufactur-
ing, chemicals, food processing, cloth-making, and daily commodity
industries.52  Meanwhile, China permits desired joint ventures 53 in-
cluding: a) energy development, building material, chemical, and
metallurgical industries; b) machine manufacturing, instrument and
meter industries and offshore oil exploitation equipment manufac-
turing; c) electronics and computer industries and communication
equipment manufacturing; d) light textile, foodstuffs, medicine, med-
ical apparatus, and packaging industries; e) agriculture, animal hus-
bandry, and fish breeding; and f) tourism and service industries.5 4
This expansive list suggests that the Chinese government wishes to
limit, to some extent, permissibility of certain types of joint ventures.
However, the fact that the list speaks in general terms would suggest
that a great array of potential investments are possible.
B. Limited Liability Companies
Joint ventures organized in North Korea must be limited liability
companies. 55 This means that the potential profits, losses or liability
for any partner to the joint venture are limited to the amount of
capital invested .5 How a North Korean joint venture company func-
tions as a legal entity is not clear due to the unavailability of texts
of relevant codes and statutes.
57
Chinese joint venture laws also provide that the joint ventures shall
take the form of a limited liability company.58 The Chinese statutory
51. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 2.
52. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 3.
53. These desired ventures were stipulated by the 1983 implementing regulations of the 1979
Joint Venture law.
54. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 3.
55. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8.
56. However, Article 9 of the North Korean JVL provides that the amount of registered
capital may not be reduced. The North Korean JVL does not require a minimum level as a
percentage of registered capital, but Article 7 of the North Korean JVL provides that the portion
of capital investment is to be decided by agreement between the parties to the joint venture. North
Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 7, 9.
57. It is reported that North Korea adopted Provisional Civil Regulations in 1982 and
Enforcement Rules of Provisional Civil Regulations in 1985. See STUDY GUmE, supra note 5, at
18.
58. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 4.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
scheme is based on the status of a company59 qualified as a legal
person. 60 The 1987 law prescribes general provisions on legal persons
6'
and a section on the company. 62 Thus, a joint venture company as
a legal entity functions as an organization which possesses civil and
legal capacity, and the capacity for civil acts according to the law.
Further, a joint venture company independently enjoys civil rights
and assumes civil obligations. 63 Since there is no commercial code
which deals with elaborated provisions on issues related to a com-
pany, they must be written in the joint venture contract or in the
articles of incorporation of the joint venture.
64
C. Equality and Reciprocity
The guiding principle that governs all joint equity ventures in
North Korea is "equality and reciprocity. 6 The basic approach to
the joint venture scheme is equal sharing of mutually beneficial
results based upon the equal status of the partners. Thus foreign and
domestic parties to the joint ventures are to possess the same rights,
privileges, and immunities, as well as being liable for the same
obligations, based on mutual dependence.
China also prescribes a similar principle of "equality and mutual
benefit."" In Chinese JVL the phrase "the principle of equality and
mutual benefit" is repeated twice. While the first statement 67 appears
in connection with the creation of joint equity ventures, the second
one is: "in handling important problems the board of directors shall
reach decisions through consultation by the participants on the prin-
ciple of equality and mutual benefit. ' 68 Thus, China seems to clarify
that the principle is to be applied both in the process of creation as
59. The 1987 Chinese Joint Venture Law provides joint equity venture enterprises with the
status of a legal entity. This principle is somewhat elaborated by the 1987 General Principles of
Civil Law, infra note 61, which sanctions Sino-foreign joint equity ventures.
60. General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 41, adopted by
the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986 [hereinafter General
Civil Principles of PRC], reprinted and translated in CumDA LAWs FOR Fonmom BusT ss 19-
150 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
61. Id. at arts. 36-40.
62. Id. at arts. 41-49.
63. Id. at arts. 36-49.
64. Any joint venture, i.e., in any jurisdiction of the United States, requires the contract and
the articles of incorporation.
65. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 1.
66. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at arts. 1, 6.
67. Id. at art. 1.
68. Id. at art. 6.
1989 / North Korean and Chinese Joint Venture Laws
well as in the solution of important problems in the actual operation
of equity joint ventures.
North Korean joint venture laws stipulate only the principle that
"the Democratic People's Republic of Korea encourages joint ven-
tures .. .based on the principle of equality and reciprocity.' '69 It is
unclear if this provision covers problems involved with both the
creation and solution of important problems of the joint ventures.
This issue should be clarified in the joint venture contract or in the
articles of incorporation of the joint ventures.
D. Legal Protection
One of the greatest concerns to participants in foreign joint ven-
tures is the loss of their investment and acquired interests due to
nationalization, expropriation or sequestration of the invested prop-
erties. North Korea's and China's arrangements to protect assets are
aimed at eliminating or reducing governmental acts by the host
country. Legal issues involving safeguarding foreign investment or
investment security are a continuing concern for foreign investors
and their advisors.
70
The North Korean government guarantees to the parties of a joint
venture "all legitimate rights stipulated by its laws in connection with
the managerial activities of the parties to a joint venture. ' 71 Also,
the government "protects by law the properties and income accruing
from the operation of the enterprise.''72 However, to be entitled to
such protection, the laws adamantly require that the parties to the
joint venture "shall respect and strictly observe the legal norms and
regulations" of North Korea in all their activities. 73 Therefore, foreign
joint venture participants would thus be well advised to familiarize
themselves with North Korean laws.
The Chinese government also protects, by the legislation in force,
the resources invested by a foreign participant in a joint venture and
"the profits due him pursuant to the agreements, contracts and
articles of incorporation ... as well as his other lawful rights and
69. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 1.
70. See generally W. KOLVENBACH, PROTECTION oF FoRamN INvEsmm : A PRivATE LAW
STUDY oF SAmEuARDiNG Dvicas IN iTERNATIONAL CiSIS STruAnoNs (1989) (primarily discussing
situation in United States and extraterritorial effects of' confiscation and appropriation, but
protective devices presented could be useful for investment in other countries).
71. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 4.
72. Id. at art. 3.
73. Id. at art. 4.
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interests." 74 Thus, not only does the government protect against
possible nationalization, expropriation or sequestration, it also com-
mits itself to the enforcement of the joint venture agreement. At the
same time, all activities of a joint venture are subject to Chinese
laws and regulations.
75
As to the question of legal protection, three observations can be
made. First, both North Korea and China stipulate legal protection
over foreign investments, acquired rights, and interests,76 but require
observation of domestic laws. 77 In order to avoid unexpected loss,
foreign investors must have prior knowledge of the extent and detail
of legal protection accorded to them, as well as what laws they are
to observe. Needless to say, full disclosure of the domestic infrastruc-
ture that is linked to the laws governing joint equity ventures is
needed. On this issue North Korea is lagging behind China. As noted
earlier, availability of a text of basic legal source information either
in Korean or in foreign languages is much desired. 78 On the other
hand, China is actively engaged in the publication and announcement
of its legal infrastructure through official79 and ufiofficial sources. 0
The second observation relates to the question of Ex Post Facto
law doctrine."' In the course of joint venturing, enterprises may face
the risk of subsequent adverse legislation. Socialist equity joint ven-
tures with non-socialist partners are relatively new. Consequently,
laws and regulations relating to joint equity ventures have often taken
the course of trial and error, resulting in subsequent unexpected
legislation affecting the operation of joint ventures.8 2 Regarding the
question of how to treat Ex Post Facto law doctrine in connection
with North Korean joint equity ventures, there is no way to assess
74. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 2.
75. Id.
76. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 3, 4; Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 2.
77. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 4; Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 2.
78. STUDy GmE, supra note 5, at 18.
79. The Bejing Review, a monthly English edition magazine, regularly features new legislation.
80. China Laws for Foreign Business, a looseleaf service of CCH Australia Ltd., also regularly
updates newly adopted legislation.
81. As to the Ex Post Facto law doctrine in the United States, see U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1; and U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
For a discussion of the Ex Post Facto law doctrine in United States law, see L. Tamn, AMsmucAN
CoNsnTunoNAL LAw, 632-56 (2d ed. 1988); J. Nowax, D. RoTUNDA & J. YouNo, CoNsTTUnoNAL
LAw 385-97 (3d ed. 1986).
82. Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Framework, in FORmoN TRADE, INV=s-
mENT, AND sa Lw iN TH PEoPLE's RmE uuc oF CHMNA 102-03 (1987) [hereinafter Moser]. See
also Comment, supra note 41, at 264-66 (suggesting possibility that harm of subsequent adverse
legislation may be reduced through use of contractual renegotiation clauses).
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the situation in North Korea, due to lack of legal source information
and actual governmental handling of joint equity ventures.
83
In China, adverse legal consequences retroactively changed by
virtue of subsequent legislation have been the subject of discussion
by western writers. 84 Chinese JVL prescribes that protection from Ex
Post Facto law is provided by "legislation in force.''85 This legislation
has been construed to mean that the effects of Ex Post Facto law
are in principle accepted in China.86 Thus, there is the possibility of
impairing previously executed terms of joint venture contracts.
87
However, it has been expressed that the Chinese stand on Ex Post
Facto law has been softened88 as a result of the enactment of the
1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law, which stipulates that "equity
joint venture contracts ... may continue to be valid when new laws
are enacted." 89 It is not clear to what extent the 1985 law changes
the already existing practiceP° A second way of avoiding Ex Post
Facto law doctrine is to insert "renegotiation clauses" in joint venture
contracts in the event that contract terms are subject to adverse
effects as a result of the enactment of new legislation. 91 Some
successful instances of this proposal have been reported.92
The third observation concerns bilateral investment protection
agreements. 93 There has been an increasing use of bilateral legal
instruments dealing with protection of foreign investment in the world
83. STUDY GumE, supra note 5, at 18. Since the 1972 North Korean Constitution is silent
on the question of Ex Post Facto law, it is necessary to rely on Article 4 of the North Korean
JVL, which prescribes that North Korea "guarantees all legitimate rights stipulated by its law in
connection with the managerial activities of the parties to a joint venture.'" North Korean JVL,
supra note 21, at art. 4. Unless a "renegotiation clause" (in the event of the enactment of adversely
harmful subsequent legislation) was inserted in the joint venture contract, foreign investors must
appeal to the government by asserting that the new legislation was unreasonable and unexpected.
84. Moser, supra note 82, at 102-03; Comment, supra note 41, at 265-66.
85. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 2. The Chinese Constitution did not treat the question
of Ex Post Facto law.
86. The legislation has been construed this way in order to promote China's own interests.
87. Moser, supra note 82, at 102-03.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 40, adopted by
the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, Mar. 21,
1985 [hereinafter FECL], reprinted and translated in CEhNA LAws FoR FOREGN BusIEss 5-550
(CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). For a discussion of the FECL, see Kim, The Modem Chinese Legal
System, supra note 4, at 1447.
90. Comment, supra note 41, at 265.
91. Id.
92. Moser, supra note 82, at 103. As to the new legislatioft changing tariff rates and the
income tax rate, see CHu & DoNG, supra note 41, at 193.
93. See generally U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CopoRAnoNs, BnATaEA INvEsTnT
TanETms (1988) (describing such agreements).
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community.94 Usually, this agreement is entered into between capital
exporting and importing countries in order to clarify the legal pro-
tection of investors under the general principles of international law. 95
While capital exporting countries could obtain useful political guar-
antees to reduce the political risk attached to investments, capital
importing countries would create a climate of confidence for the
investors.
As far as North Korea is concerned, there is no ascertainable
official announcement that the country has entered into an investment
protection agreement with any non-socialist country. On the other
hand, China is actively using this form of international agreement
to encourage foreign investment, as China considers that the utili-
zation of a bilateral agreement brings mutually beneficial results.96
Starting with Sweden in 1982,97 China concluded a series of invest-
ment protection agreements with more than twenty countries. 98 Recent
agreements are with Australia99 and Japan,100 both concluded in 1988.
The agreement with Australia, for instance, includes such clauses as
national treatment of investments;'01 settlement oi disputes;t 2 trans-
parency of laws;'013 and expropriation and nationalization.1° Usually
expropriation and nationalization of foreign investment has been the
focal point in negotiating bilateral agreements. 05 The China-Australia
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Note, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, 2 J. CHU40E L. 405, 427-28 (1988) [hereinafter Note].
97. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982, China-Sweden,
reprinted in 4 E. AsLAN ExactmvE REP. 25 (1982).
98. Note, supra note 96, at 427-28.
99. Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Australia-
China, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 121 (1989) [hereinafter Australia-PRC Agreement].
100. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Aug. 27, 1988, China-Japan, reprinted in 10 E. AsIA Exactrriv REP. 23, (1988).
101. Australia-PRC Agreement, supra note 99, at art. III; 28 I.L.M. at 127-28.
102. Id. at arts. V, XII, and XIII; 28 I.L.M. at 129-31.
103. Id. at art. VI; 28 I.L.M. at 130. Article VI provides:
Each Contracting Party shall, with a view to promoting the understanding of its laws
and policies that pertain to or affect investments in its territory of nationals of the
other Contracting Party:
(a) make such laws and policies public and readily accessible;
(b) if requested, provide copies of specified laws and policies to the other Contracting
Party; and
(c) if requested, consult with the other Contracting Party with a view to explaining
specified laws and policies.
Id.; 28 I.L.M. at 130.
104. Id. at art. VIII; 28 I.L.M. at 130-31.
105. As to the discussion of nationalization and expropriation from the Australian perspective,
see Kohona, Investment Protection Agreements: An Australian Perspective, 21 J. WoRua TaaE
L. 79, 95-98 (1987).
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agreement, for instance, stipulates that:
A Contracting Party shall not take measures of expropriation or
nationalization or other measures having a similar effect relating to
any investment unless the measures are in the public interest, non-
discriminatory, in accordance with the law of the Contracting Party
which has admitted the investment and against reasonable compen-
sation.106
China and the United States have been negotiating toward the
completion of an investment protection agreement since 1983.107 In
the course of its negotiations, the United States has been using its
1982 model bilateral investment agreement. 108 The following three
vexing issues have surfaced: 1°9 1) national treatment of foreign in-
vestments;110 2) expropriation and compensation;' and 3) dispute
settlements. "12
E. Overseas Korean Capital
North Korean JVL 3 and JVL Regulations" 4 have special provi-
sions to induce Koreans living abroad to participate in North Korean
joint equity ventures. There are no similar provisions in Chinese
106. Australia-PRC Agreement, supra note 99, at art. VIII; 28 I.L.M. at 130-31. Article VIII
stipulates the method of valuation in the following words:
The compensation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be computed on the
basis of the market value of the investment immediately before the measures became
public knowledge. Where the market value cannot be readily ascertained, the compen-
sation shall be determined in accordance with generally recognized principles of valuation
and equitable principles taking into account the capital invested, depreciation, capital
already repatriated, replacement value and other relevant factors. The compensation
shall include interest at a reasonable rate from the date the measures were taken to the
date of payment, shall be paid without undue delay, shall be freely convertible and
shall be freely transferable between the territories of the Contracting Parties at the
average of the daily exchange rates, determined on each of those days in accordance
with the law of the Contracting Party which has admitted the investment, over the six
months immediately prior to the taking of the measures.
Id.; 28 I.L.M. at 131.
*107. Note, supra note 96, at 432-57.
108. Treaty between the United States of America and - Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Jan. 11, 1982, reprinted in EXPORT WEmLY (BNA)
734 (Mar. 23, 1982); Revised Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Feb. 24, 1984, reprinted in 20
EXPORT WEEKY (BNA) 960 (1984). See also Vandervelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program
of the United States, 21 CoRmL ITrr'L L.J. 201 (1988).
109. Note, supra note 96, at 432-57.
110. Id. at 433-41.
111. Id. at 441-51. The Note discusses the Otis Elevator case at 450-51. As to the Chinese
experiences of nationalization, see Laifman, Treaties and Nationalization: The People's Republic
of China Experience, 11 HAsTGs INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 325 (1988).
112. Note, supra note 96, at 452-55.
113. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 5.
114. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 9.
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law." 5 North Korean law makes special reference to Korean traders
and manufacturers in Japan" 6 whose political ideology is compa-
rable to the North Korean party line. This reference is in line with
the 1972 North Korean Constitution'17 and the 1963 North Korean
Nationality Law.1 8 According to the report, Korean residents in
Japan, who are sympathetic to the North Korean cause, have
become a primary source of investment in North Korea." 9
China has also adopted similar legal measures to encourage over-
seas Chinese to invest in China by providing tax benefits. 20 In the
eyes of Chinese authorities, it is surmised that overseas Chinese are
well versed concerning the situation in China. It is easy to com-
municate with them by appealing to their compatriotic spirits. At
the same time, investment by overseas Chinese in China may become
a stimulus for other foreign nationals to invest in China.
III. ORGANIZATION OF EQUITY JOINT VENTURE COMPANIES
Both North Korea' 2' and China' 22 prescribe a process involved in
organizing joint equity ventures.
115. Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China,
arts. 5-12, adopted by the State Council, Dec. 5, 1980, promulgated Dec. 18, 1980, reprinted and
translated in CHNA LAWS FoR FORmoN Busnqss 8-550 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). The
Regulations prescribe exchange control relating to enterprises with overseas Chinese capital. See
also Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations Relating to Enterprises with
Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital and Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures,
approved by the State Council, July 19, 1983, promulgated by the State Administration of
Exchange Control, Aug. 1, 1983, reprinted and translated in CmNA LAWS FoR FORON Busumss
8-670 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). The Rules define the term "enterprises with overseas Chinese
capital" as "corporations, enterprises or other economic entities registered in China with overseas
Chinese capital or capital of compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao areas, and managed
independently or jointly with Chinese enterprises." Id.
116. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 5; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 9.
117. Article 65 of the North Korean Constitution prescribes that "all the Korean citizens
abroad are legally protected by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Socialist Const. of
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Article 65.
118. As to the discussion of overseas Koreans in connection with the 1963 Nationality Law,
see SmEcra WRrms, supra note 2, at 313.
119. Predictions and Realities, 136 FAR E. EcON. REv. 115 (1987). According to Chongnyon
Bank Delegation Visits Pyongyang, FBIS-EAS-89-076 at 15 (Apr. 21, 1989), there is the joint
venture bank of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon). It was
further reported that the first meeting of the Council of the Korean Joint Venture Bank was held
in Pyongyang on April 20, 1989, and officers of the bank were elected. See Council of Joint
Venture Bank Meets 20 April, FBIS-EAS-89-080 at 21 (Apr. 27, 1989). As to the new joint venture
with the participation of Korean residents in Japan, see Hamhung Chemical Joint Venture
Construction, id. at 25.
120. Suzuki, Koben kanrenho (Joint Venture Related Laws), in Chugoku kenkyujo (The
Chinese Research Institute ed.), CHuGOKU KmON Hoamsnu (CouLLcrm Fu.tamrAL LAWS OF
CHINA) 571 (1988).
121. See North Korean JVL, supra note 21; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24.
122. See Chinese JVL, supra note 29; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30.
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A. North Korea
In North Korea at least four identifiable procedures are required.
1. Finding Parties
If a North Korean enterprise wishes to establish an equity joint
venture with a foreign partner, it must obtain approval from the
Ministry of External Economic Affairs in order to commence ne-
gotiations.1 23 If a foreign partner wishes to form a joint equity
venture with a North Korean entity, the Ministry of External Eco-
nomic Affairs can introduce the foreign partner to potential do-
mestic partners.
2. Conclusion of the Joint Venture Contract
Once the foreign party and the North Korean partner have agreed
to form a company, they "shall conclude a contract concerning the
organization of the joint venture company, and then shall receive
the approval of the Ministry of External Economic Affairs." 12 This
contract should contain such terms as contracting parties; name of
the joint venture; duration of the joint venture; total amount of
registered capital and each party's share; organization of the board
of directors; number of company employees; and provision for
wages and security of living conditions for employees.
1 25
3. Adoption of Articles of Incorporation
The next step is for the board of directors of the joint venture
to adopt articles of incorporation which contain the principles and
procedures of the joint venture's business activities.1 26 The articles
contain such information as the name and location of the company;
the total capital investment and proportion of contributed capital
investment by each party; and the life duration of the joint ven-
ture. 27
123. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 10.
124. Id. at art. 11.
125. Id. at art. 12.
126. Id. at art. 15.
127. Id.
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4. Registration
The joint venture is required to register with the appropriate
provincial people's committee. 28 This requires submission of an
application for registration of the company, documents showing
joint venture contract approval, articles of the company's incor-
poration, and confirmed documents to certify capital investment. 129
From the day of registration, a joint venture company becomes a
judicial entity. 130 If the joint venture company wishes to revise the
content of the registered documents, it must seek approval of the
Ministry of External Economic Affairs, and then notify the regis-
tering agency of the revised content.13'
B. China
At least 10 discernible procedural steps are set out to organize
and reach the final stage of receiving an operational license for a
joint equity venture. 132
1. Finding Parties
Foreign investors who are unable to find Chinese partners may
seek assistance in finding potential Chinese participants through the
central and provincial government organizations, including the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC).133
2. Project Proposal and Preliminary Feasibility Study
When there is a union of foreign and domestic partners, both
sides must prepare a project proposal and a preliminary feasibility
study through negotiations. 134 The statute requires that the Chinese
side submit both the project proposal and preliminary feasibility
128. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 13.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at art. 14.
132. See Chinese JVL, supra note 29; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30.
133. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 12. As to the discussion of how to find
the right partner, see Yuging, supra note 38, at 67-78. As to the discussion of the Charter of the
CITIC, see Comment, supra note 41, at 257-67. See also CHU & DoNG, supra note 41, at 282-84
(discussion of requirements for foreign and Chinese partners).
134. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 9. As to the definition of the term
"project" used in project proposal, see CHu & DoNG, supra note 41, at 276-80.
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study to the government department in charge of the Chinese partner
in the proposed joint venture.
13 5
3. Approval by the Department in Charge
Both the project proposal and the preliminary feasibility study
are examined by the government department in charge. 3 6 Through
negotiations, the preliminary feasibility study develops into a more
refined and formalized study. Once the proposal and feasibility
study meet with the approval of the department in charge, docu-
ments are transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade (MOFERT) in the capital.
37
4. Initial Approval
MOFERT renders an initial approval of the project proposal and
feasibility study. 38 In the event the matter is entrusted to another
government agency with the power to examine and approve the
establishment of the joint venture, the entrusted agency examines
and disposes of the initial approval.1
39
5. Conclusion of Joint Venture Agreement and Contract
When the parties receive initial approval from MOFERT or its
entrusted agency, the next step is to arrive at a joint venture
agreement and contract. 40 According to the statute, the agreement
precedes the contract.' 41 The statutory definition of the joint venture
agreement is "a document agreed upon by the parties to the joint
135. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 9.
136. Id. A model outline of a feasibility study for a Chinese-foreign joint venture in English
is available elsewhere. See Moser, supra note 82, at 90, 139-41.
137. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 8. However, Article 3 of the Chinese
JVL prescribes that the examining and approval authority is the Foreign Investment Commission
of the People's Republic of China. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 3. Created by the
Regulation of the State Council, the Foreign Investment Commission was established by the law
of the National People's Congress. Obviously the National People's Congress is superior in power
to the State Council; however, there seems to be no distinction between law enacted by the
National People's Congress and a regulation adopted by the State Council in China.
138. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 8.
139. Id.
140. Id. at art. 9. As to the approval authority, Article 3 of the Chinese JVL designated the
Foreign Investment Commission of the People's Republic of China, but MOFERT became the
approval authority under Article 8 of the Chinese JVL Regulations. See Chinese JVL, supra note
29, at art. 3; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 8.
141. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 9. There is no formal requirement for
the parties to sign the agreement. Id. at art. 13.
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venture on some main points and principles governing the estab-
lishment of a joint venture. 1' 42 The statute also defines a joint
venture contract as "a document agreed upon and concluded by
the parties to the joint venture on their rights and obligations."'' 43
The contract represents the final agreement of the parties concerned,
and is the basic organic document which lays the groundwork for
the establishment of the venture. The statute further stipulates that
only Chinese law will be applied in the settlement of disputes related
to the formation of the joint venture contract.'" When terms of a
joint venture agreement and contract conflict, the latter prevails.145
6. Adoption of Articles of Incorporation
When a joint venture contract is concluded, the next task is to
adopt articles of incorporation, which serve as the enterprise's rules
of governance.' 4 Definition of articles of incorporation, according
to statute, is "a document agreed upon by the parties to the joint
venture indicating the purpose, organizational principles and method
of management of a joint venture in compliance with the principles
of the joint venture contract.' 47 "The examining and approval
authority and the registration and administration office are respon-
sible for the supervision and inspection of the execution of the joint
venture contract" and the articles of incorporation. 48
7. Applications
The Chinese side is responsible for processing the application
before the examining and approval authority to establish the joint
142. Id. at art. 9.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145.. Id. at art. 13. MOFERT has published a model joint venture contract and other model
contracts are also available. See Moser, supra note 82, at 142-56. As to another model, see 1
PRC LAws FOR CHINA TRaDEIs & h nross: PRACtcE & NTERPRETATioN 458-70 (Chiu ed.
1983) [hereinafter PRAcncE & INTERPRETATION]. See also KYOKAWA & NIsiwuRA, Cmuroou
GOBMNKKYOHO NO RMON TO rZUMU ('HEORY AND PRACTICE OF TIM CHInmM JoINr VmTURE
LAws) 102-49 (1988) [hereinafter KYOKAWA & NimMaw.A] (discussing contents of nine models of
Chinese joint venture contracts).
146. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 9.
147. Id. at art. 13.
148. Id. at art. 18. MOFERT has drafted model articles of incorporation and other models
are also available. See Moser, supra note 82, at 157-69. As to another model, see PRACnCE &
INTERRETATioN, supra note 145, at 458-70. See also KIrOIKAWA & NismnuIR, supra note 145, at
151-85 (discussing contents of three models of Chinese articles of incorporation).
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venture. 49 The statute stipulates the submission of the following
five documents: 50
1) an application for establishment of the joint venture;
2) the feasibility study, jointly prepared by the parties to the
venture;
3) the joint venture agreement, contract and articles of incorpo-
ration, duly signed by representatives of the parties concerned;
4) a list of the chairman, vice-chairman, and candidates for the
board of directors of the joint venture, nominated by the parties;
and
5) written opinions of the department in charge of the Chinese
participant and the opinions of appropriate provincial, autono-
mous or municipal government where the joint venture is located,
with regards to the establishment of the joint venture.
The above mentioned documents must be written in Chinese, but
the second, third, and fourth documents can be simultaneously
written in a foreign language, subject to agreement by the parties
to the joint venture.'5 ' In this instance, both versions are equally
authentic. 52 Applications to establish joint ventures must meet one
or more of the following requirements:
1) They shall adopt advanced technical equipment and scientific
management which enable the increase of the variety of products,
the raising of quality and output, and the saving of energy and
materials;
2) They shall provide benefits in terms of technical renovation of
enterprises and result in less investment, quicker returns and bigger
profits;
3) They shall enable the expanded production of products for
export and result in increasing income in foreign currency; and
4) They shall enable the training of technical and managerial
personnel. "'
8. Authorization To Establish a Joint Venture by the
Examining and Approval Authority
The approval authority is usually MOFERT. 54 If the matter is
entrusted to another agency under the statute, a final report by the




153. Id. at art. 4.
154. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 8. Article 8 requires that the approval
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entrusted agency to MOFERT is required.1 55 The authority is re-
quired to render a decision regarding approval or disapproval of
the application within three months from the date the required
documents were received. 5 6 The authority may request a revision
of submitted documents within a time frame set by the authorities. 157
Approval may be denied if the revisions are not made within that
time limit.
158
The application is denied if the joint venture involves any of the
following conditions:
1) Detriment to China's sovereignty;
2) Violation of Chinese law;
3) Nonconformity with the requirements of the development of
China's national economy;
4) Environmental pollution; and
5) Obvious inequity in the agreements, contracts and articles of
association signed, impairing the rights and interests of one party. 19
9. Registration
Within one month after receipt of the certificate of approval by
the approval authority, the joint venture is required to register with
the Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce in the prov-
ince, autonomous region or municipality where the joint venture is
located. 60 Provisions of the Regulations of the People's Republic
of China on the Registering and Administration of Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment require the submission of
the following documents:
1) a request for registration in triplicate, signed by at least one
representative from each side;
2) the document of approval issued by the ratifying authority, in
triplicate;
3) the basic agreements of the joint venture, including the joint
authority examine if the applicant has complied with the following:
1) The total amount of investment is within the limit set by the State Council and the
source of capital of the Chinese participants has been ascertained; and
2) No additional allocations of raw materials by the state are required and the national
balance of fuel, power, transportation and foreign trade export quotas are not affected.
Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at art. 10.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 5.
160. Id. at art. 11.
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venture contract and articles of association (in Chinese and the
languages of the foreign parties, in triplicate);
4) the feasibility study;
5) a certificate of legitimacy issued by the appropriate government
department in the foreign partner's or partners' country; and
6) "(v)erified documents concerning construction conditions, such
as environmental protection, urban construction, water and power
supply" issued by the Chinese authorities concerned. 1
6'
Revision of the terms of agreement, contract or articles of incor-
poration is forbidden without permission of the examining and
approving authority. 62
10. Receipt of License to Operate the Joint Venture
The Administrator of Industry and Commerce issues the business
license. 63 When the license is issued, a joint venture enterprise
becomes a judicial entity. The date of the joint venture is formally
established. 164
C. Comparative Analysis
The foregoing discussion shows that a wide gap exists between
North Korean and Chinese procedural aspects in establishing equity
joint ventures. As far as the procedures for finding partners is
concerned, North Korea requires that the domestic partner, who
wishes to engage in the establishment of a joint venture, must
receive approval from the Ministry of External Economic Affairs.1
65
On this issue, Chinese law is silent. It may be surmised that China
is somewhat relaxed and allows Chinese enterprises to use their own
initiative in finding foreign partners. Ordinarily, Chinese traders
can find foreign partners by attending international trade fairs and
may undertake immediate preliminary negotiations.
Notably lacking in the North Korean procedural steps, but ap-
pearing in the Chinese procedures, are the following four illustra-
tions: First, as discussed earlier, the Chinese statute stipulates the
procedures involved in the preparation and approval of the project
proposal and the preliminary feasibility study. Further, the statute
161. As to a summary of this aspect of procedure, see Yuging, supra note 38, at 71.
162. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 5.
163. Id. at art. 11.
164. Id.
165. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art..10.
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dictates the flow of the procedure from the government department
in charge of the Chinese partner, to the role of the examining and
approval authority in the initial steps of establishing a joint venture.
There is no North Korean statute dealing with this process. Given
North Korea's unknown body of civil code and commercial law,
initial steps for preparing the project proposal and feasibility study
may be very much needed. These initial steps help lead to a
meticulously drafted joint venture contract. A series of thorough
negotiations to provide a list of the rights and liabilities of the
parties to the joint venture may also be helpful.
Second, the North Korean statute does not require a conclusion
of a joint venture agreement; however, China provides the agree-
ment as an optional step. China gives statutory definitions of an
agreement, a contract, and articles of incorporation of the joint
venture. Through official and non-official sources, China provides
sample models of agreements, contracts, and articles of incorpora-
tion. Needless to say, sample models are useful for investors to
examine in advance to learn about the required contents of the
basic legal documents. This area of activity is much desired in North
Korea, in order to attract viable foreign investors.
Third, the Chinese statute designates that the Chinese partner
prepare a project proposal and feasibility study, and also process
the application to establish the joint venture. The Chinese statute
also prescribes clearly the most essential documents and also the
language requirement in the application process. The statute of
North Korea may require further improvement in this area to
incorporate Chinese practices into its own use.
Fourth, the Chinese statute prescribes two important time limits
with respect to the creation of joint ventures. The Chinese examining
and approval authority is under an obligation to approve or dis-
approve the application within three months of the date that the
application to establish a joint venture is submitted. The Chinese
statute futher requires the submission of specified documents within
one month from the date on which the examining and approval
authority renders a final decision. As discussed earlier, North Korea
does not have the two time limits which are incorporated into the
Chinese statute. Because of this, potential western investors would
face the difficulty of planning within the time frame.
Chinese law is silent as to which side of the proposed joint
venture should be responsible for incurred expenses. 166 At the same
166. This silence has created concern over the preparation of the project proposal and the
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time, there may be a need for legislation to specify the basis for
the approval of the joint venture application by the examining and
approval authority in China. On this issue, Yugoslavia provides a
legislative example. Article 42 of its 1978 Law on Foreign Investment
in Yugoslav Organizations of Associated Labor prescribes that:
[T]he investment contract shall be approved if the following con-
ditions are met:
1) if it conforms to the provisions of this law and other statutes;
2) if it provides for business cooperation which guarantees in-
creased production, higher labor productivity and larger exports
or construction of new facilities on the basis of up-to-date tech-
nology and business economics; if it provides for the introduction
and application of up-to-date engineering, technology and organ-
ization of production and business operation in the domestic
organization of associated labor; if it provides for environmental
protection, or if it contributes to advancement of scientific research
in the domestic organization of associated labor;
3) if the total amount of capital which the parties to the contract
are to invest in the joint venture ensures attainment of the con-
ditions referred to under Point 2 of this paragraph;
4) if the terms of business cooperation envisaged conform to the
conditions under which such cooperation is normally conducted in
international economic relations;
5) if the share of the foreign person (patent rights, licenses,
technology, etc.) has been realistically assessed;
6) if the capital to be invested by the foreign person is not less
than the limit or value set by the Federal Executive Council;
7) if it conforms to the policy governing Yugoslavia's economic
relations with foreign countries and Yugoslavia's balance of pay-
ments.
16 7
China has been actively engaged in the enactment of a series of
legislation dealing with equity joint ventures since 1979. Problems
arising under the equity joint venture legislation have been resolved
by means of trial and error.1 68 There seems to be a question of how
to treat articles of incorporation, which are an essential element of
the joint venture. Suffice to note here two issues which are highly
relevant, the first of which is what the solution should be when
feasibility study of a proposed creation of a joint venture. See Comment, supra note 41, at 268
n.48.
167. As to the English text of the law, see ICSID, 10 INvEs m m LAws op m WoRu
(1984).
168. Kim, The Modem Chinese Legal System, supra note 4, at 1446.
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articles of incorporation conflict with subsequent legislation. In
terms of a joint venture contract adversely affected by subsequent
legislation, a suggestion was made to insert this issue in the joint
venture contract by stipulating the need for renegotiations.1 69 How-
ever, it should be argued that when the terms of the articles of
incorporation are adversely affected by subsequent legislation, the
terms of the articles of incorporation should be honored, because
the very terms were approved by a government agency. It should
also be noted that the government is a semi-partner to the joint
venture by virtue of the state planned economy. It could also be
argued that governmental approval of the terms of the articles of
incorporation and subsequent legislation are both governmental
actions, and there should be no discrimination between the two
actions.
Second, there is the need to improve the public notice aspect of
articles of incorporation. Chinese law is silent as to how to create
public access to articles of incorporation of a joint venture company.
The terms of the articles of incorporation should be publicly pro-
nounced to protect the interests of the employees of the joint venture
enterprise as well as third parties. 70 If the Chinese government is
opposed to releasing articles of incorporation in public, then it
should encourage joint enterprises to adopt by-laws, which do not
usually require filing with a public office.' 7' Providing a definition
of by-laws in the statute, which could be distinguished from articles
of incorporation, may serve the purpose.
IV. CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Both North Korea 72 and China 73 stipulate issues related to.capital
investment made by equity joint venture companies.
169. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
170. See generally R. ScmHEs-NGca, et al., ComPARAT.vE LAW, 696-702 (5th ed. 1988) (publi-
cation of articles of incorporation). The public notice requirement of articles of association can
be found in the SoumH KoREAN ComsncuL CODE at art. 396; and in the Japanese SH'H6U
[Commercial Code] at art. 263. The English texts of these two articles respectively appear in the
Korean Legal Center, 3 LAW oF m REPUBUc oF KoREA (1987) and EHS, LAW BULLETI Smuas,
JAPAN: ROPPO (1984).
171. HmrN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoPoRAnoNs 306-10 (3d ed. 1983).
172. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 7-9; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at arts. 16-23.
173. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at arts. 4-5; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at
arts. 19-32.
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A. North Korea
The subject of North Korean capital investment can be discussed
under four headings.
1. Total Amount of Investment and Registered Capital
The statute prescribes that the total amount of investment is
determined by the joint venture contract, 174 without providing a
definition of the total amount of the investment. It is surmised that
by using words such as "total amount of investment," North Korea
would allow the equity in the joint venture as collateral to secure
outside borrowing, probably from North Korean banks. The statute
provides also that registered capital cannot be reduced.
75
2. Forms of Capital Investment
According to the statutes, capital contributions can be made in
cash, buildings, raw materials, machine equipment, invention rights,
technical documentation, and land.
176
a. Cash Contributions
In the case of cash contributions, the currency designation is
subject to agreement by the parties to the joint venture.'
77
b. Non-Cash Contributions
When the capital contribution is in the form of either buildings,
raw materials or machine equipment, the valuation of investment
is to be made by the parties to the joint venture, based upon
international market prices. 78 If the land is not part of the capital
investment, the joint venture pays a land-use fee, established by the
state agency.
79
174. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 6.
175. Id. at art. 21; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 9.
176. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 7; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 17.
177. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 18.
178. Id. at art. 19; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 7.
179. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 20.
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c. The Ratio of Foreign Capital Contribution
There is no statutory minimum or maximum limitation on the
ratio of capital contribution by the foreign and domestic partners
to the joint venture. 180 The ratio is determined by the joint venture
contract.""' The parties to the joint venture assume liability only
for their portion of the investment which regards debts incurred by
the joint venture company in the course of its operation.
18 2
d. Transferability of Shares of Registered Capital
The statutes prescribe a restriction on transfers of invested capi-
tal. 83 A transfer of a part or the whole portion of a party's
investment can be made only with the consent of the other party
to the joint venture. 8 4
B. China
The Chinese approach to capital investment can be discussed
under five headings.
1. Total Amount of Investment and Registered Capital
Chinese law clearly distinguishes between the total amount of
investment and registered capital.'' While the former is the total
amount of the registered capital, including loans (external borrow-
ings), 8 6 the latter is capital investment registered with the registering
agency. 8 7 By recognizing the concept of the total amount of in-
vestment, in addition to registered capital, the Chinese approach
allows exemption from customs duty, and from industrial and
commercial consolidated tax, for importation of machinery, equip-
ment, parts and other materials, and also allows equity funds which
180. Id. at art. 16; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 7.
181. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 7; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 16.
182. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 22.
183. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 23.
184. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 23.
185. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 21-22.
186. Id. at art. 21.
187. Id.
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are part of the joint venture's total amount of investment.'88 The
1987 Provisional Regulations of the State Administration for In-
dustry and Commerce on the Ratio between the Registered Capital
and Total Investment of Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises sets
a ratio between registered capital and the total amount of invest-
ment. 189 There is a statutory provision which prohibits a change in
registered capital. 90 In principle, registered capital is presented in
Renminbi, Chinese official currency.' 9' However, registered capital
can be in a foreign currency, pursuant to an agreement by the
parties to the joint venture. 92
2. Forms of Capital Contribution
The statute stipulates two forms of capital contribution. 93
a. Cash Contributions
Cash contributions can be made either in Renminbi or foreign
currency. 94 The statute requires cash contributions by the Chinese
partner to be in Renminbi. 195 The foreign partner may make his
contribution in either Renminbi or foreign currency. 96 In the latter
case, foreign currency is to be converted into Renminbi, according
to the exchange rate announced by the State General Administrator
of Foreign Exchange Control on the day of its submission, or cross-
exchanged into a predetermined foreign currency.'9 In the case of
conversion of Renminbi into foreign currency, conversion is made
according to the exchange rate announced by the State General
188. Id. at art. 71. This approach seems to provide, indirectly, preferential treatment for
foreign investors. In the course of the operation of an equity joint venture company, foreign
investors could use the equity for loans from a Chinese bank, thus minimizing the political and
economic risks.
189. As to the discussion of this statute, see Moser, supra note 82, at 106. It is reported that
the State Council issued "Certain Regulations on the Subscription of Capital by the Parties to
Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises" on December 30, 1987, in order to set a deadline for parties
to all existing joint ventures to contribute promised capital. Of the nearly $20 billion promised in
foreign investment, only $6.75 billion had actually been received as of 1988. See Recent Devel-
opment, Current Development in the People's Republic of China: Has China Changed? I
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 505, 519-20 (1988).
190. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 22.
191. Id. at art. 21.
192. Id.
193. Id. at arts. 25-32; Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 5.
194. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 21.
195. Id. at art. 26. However, the cash Renminbi could be converted into foreign currency. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Administrator of Foreign Currency on the day of submission of
funds. 198
b. Non-Cash Contributions
Non-cash contributions include buildings, premises, equipment and
other materials, industrial property, know-how, and the right to use
a site. 199 Monetary valuation of non-cash contributions is made
through consultation by the parties to the joint venture based upon
fairness and reasonableness, or is made by a third party agreed upon
by parties to the joint venture. 200 Either way, the price fixed should
not go higher than the current international market price for similar
objects.2
0'
The monetary valuation of the right to use a site is the same as
the site-use fee otherwise paid for acquiring such a site.2e This means
that the Chinese side could determine the price unilaterally. 23 When
the foreign partner contributes machinery, equipment or other ma-
terials as investment, the objects have to be indispensable for the
production of the joint venture, and not capable of being manufac-
tured by the Chinese.204 Justification is needed for exceptions, such
as when the cost of manufacturing the object in China is too high,
or when the technical performance and time availability fail to meet
the demand. 20 1 When the foreign partner contributes industrial prop-
erty or know-how as investments, the objects have to meet one of
the following three conditions:
1) capable of manufacturing new products urgently needed in
China or products suitable for export;
2) capable of improving markedly the performance quality of
198. Id.
199. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 5; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
24.
200. Under Article 5 of the Chinese JVL and under Article 48 of the Chinese JVL Regulations,
the Chinese participant to the joint venture is allowed to use his "right to use a site" as an
investment. This right is to be exercised in accordance with Articles 47-53 of the Chinese JVL
Regulations. As to assignment of rights to use land in China, see Law of the People's Republic
of China on Land Management, adopted by the Sixteenth Session of the Standing Committee 6f
the Sixth National People's Congress, June 25, 1986, as amended by the Fifth Session of the
Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, Dec. 29, 1988, reprinted and
translated in Cxnna LAws tort Foncm Busn-s 14-715 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
201. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 27.
202. Id. at art. 48. As to the discussion of limits for site use, see Comment, supra note 41,
at 273-74.
203. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 49.
204. Id. at art. 27.
205. Id.
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existing products and raising productivity; and
3) capable of notable savings in raw materials, fuel or power.
2
06
Technology and equipment contributed by any foreign party as
investment must be "truly advanced and appropriate to China's
needs. "207 In case of losses caused by deception through intentional
provision of outdated equipment or technology, the party who pro-
vided the outdated material must compensate for the losses .
2
08
Non-cash contributions by the foreign partner require examination
and approval of the department in charge of the Chinese partner.
Next, the approval of the examining and approval authority must be
requested. 20 9 Accordingly, in the event the foreign partner contributes
industrial property or know-how, he must present relevant documen-
tation on the individual property or know-how, including photocopies
of the patent certificates or trademarks, registration certificates,
statements of validity, technical characteristics, practical value, the
basis for calculating the price, and the price agreement signed with
the Chinese partner. 210 All of these are to serve as an annex to the
contract .
211
To effectuate such non-cash contributions as industrial property
or know-how, a series of legislation has been enacted, which includes
Regulations on Administration of Technology Import Contracts of
the People's Republic of China,212 Detailed Rules for the Implemen-
tation of the Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of
China on Technology Import Contracts, 213 and Law of the People's
Republic of China on Technology Contracts.2 1 4 It is assumed that
the price fixed on non-cash contributions by the Chinese partner will
206. Id. at art. 28.
207. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 5. As to criteria for advanced technology, see
Comment, supra note 41, at 275.
208. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 5.
209. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 30.
210. Id. at art. 29. See also Lee, China's New Technology Import Regulations, 5 CHINA L.
REP. 27 (1988) [hereinafter Lee].
211. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 29.
212. Regulations on Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic
of China, approved by the State Council, Dec. 30, 1987, promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade, Jan. 20, 1989, reprinted and translated in CHINA LAws FOR
FoaN Busnmm 5-570 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
213. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Technology Import Contracts, approved by the State Council, Dec. 30,
1987, promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Jan. 20, 1989,
reprinted and translated in CHINA LAws FOR FoaN Busmss 5-573 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
214. Law of the People's Republic of China on Technology Contracts, adopted by the Twenty-
First Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, June 23, 1989,
reprinted and translated in CmNA LAWS FORFOREIGN Busnqm 5-577 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
be properly evaluated by the foreign partner during the course of
negotiations.
c. The Ratio of Foreign Capital Contribution
The ratio of contributing capital by foreign participants to the
joint venture cannot go below 25%, but there is no maximum. 215
Even if the foreign participant contributes more than 50% of the
joint venture capital investment, control of the joint venture is
unlikely, because the statute prescribes that the chairman of the
board of directors must be the Chinese participant.216 The profits,
risks and losses of a joint venture are shared by the participants in
the venture, in proportion to their contribution to the registered
capital.
217
d. Transferability of Registered Capital
The transfer of one party's share in the registered capital can be
effected only with the consent of the other parties to the venture,
218
and is subject to approval from the examining and approving au-
thority. 2 9 Furthermore, the other party has a preemptory purchase
right to accept the transfer. 220 It is assumed that if the other party
lacks the capital or refuses to receive the transfer, transfer to a third
party is allowed. However, the conditions of transfer to the third
party should be as favorable as those offered to the joint venture
participant. 22' An offer contrary to the above stated conditions in-
dicates an ineffective transfer.m
215. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 4. According to Zhang Yuging:
In 1984 there were 651 Sino-foreign joint ventures in China. Projects in which a majority
of total investment was assumed by Chinese parties accounted for 64% of this total;
27% of the projects had each side contribute 50%; projects in which the majority shares
were assumed by foreign investors were around 9% [citation omitted]. Only one Sino-
foreign joint venture had a foreign investment of 99% .... It also appears from the
1984 data that some foreign investors invested less than 25%.
Yuging, supra note 38, at 79. See also CHu & DONo, supra note 41, at 366-416 (discussing foreign
capital contribution).
216. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 6; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
34.
217. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 4.
218. Id.; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 23.
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e. Duty to Make Payments
Participants to the joint venture are required to make payment of
all the investment promised, according to the time limit stipulated in
the joint venture contract. 22 Pursuant to the 1988 Certain Regulations
on the Subscription of Capital by the Parties to Sino-foreign Joint
Equity Enterprises, delay or partial delay in payment must be subject
to an interest payment on the arrears, or a compensation for the
loss, as defined in the contract. 224 The rate of interest on arrears
follows the stipulation of the joint venture contract. If the contract
lacks a stipulation, the legal rate of interest should be used. Since
both the Foreign Economic Contract Law22 and General Principles
of Civil Lawn6 are silent on this issue, special legislation may be
needed. The certificates of payment are issued by the joint venture
company, pursuant to prescribed formality,227 followed by verification
by a Chinese registered accountant, stating that contributions of both
sides have been fully paid up.2
3. Comparative Analysis
The foregoing presentation of North Korean and Chinese statutory
schemes on capital investment shows that the North Korean statute
provides fewer statutory provisions, whereas the Chinese statute
prescribes more statutory articles to deal with the issues involved.
North Korean statutes do not provide a definition of the total
amount of investment which can be distinguished from registered
capital. Assuming that North Korea allows the concept of total
amount of investment, there is a need to adopt a statute (perhaps
patterned after the 1987 Chinese statute discussed earlier), to set up
a ratio between registered capital and total amount of investment.
Both North Korea and China use the two forms of capital invest-
ment, cash and non-cash contributions. As the foregoing discussion
223. Id. at art. 31.
224. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 7; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
31.
225. FECL, supra note 89.
226. General Civil Principles of PRC, supra note 60.
227. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 32, requires the following information:
name of the joint venture; date, month and year of the establishment of the joint venture; names
of the participants and investment contributed; date, month and year of the contributions of the
investment; and date, month and year of issuance of the investment certificate. Id.
228. Id.
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indicates, Chinese statutory provisions are more elaborate than those
of North Korea. Both countries allow currency designation, pursuant
to the agreement of the parties to the joint venture. However, North
Korea fails to follow the Chinese approach of conversion procedure
in cases where foreign currency is designated.
Issues involving non-cash contributions as investment are thorny.
While North Korean statutes are silent, China elaborates on the
following issues: the use of a third party in valuing non-cash contri-
butions as investment; the required substantiation that non-cash
objects are either indispensable to production of the joint venture,
or are not capable of being manufactured in China; the imposition
of compensatory payments for deceptive or intentional introduction
of outdated equipment or technology; and the approval process,
statutory conditions and required documentation of non-cash contri-
butions-notably industrial property or know-how.
Insofar as the ratio between foreign capital contribution and the
contribution made by the domestic side is concerned, there is no
statutory minimum requirement or maximum limitation in North
Korea. However, China requires a minimum ratio of 25% foreign
contribution, and there is no ban on maximum contribution. The
permission of unrestricted foreign investment contribution allowed
by China is offset by requiring that the chairman of the board of
directors of a joint venture company be Chinese. This provides a
safety valve to preventing foreign control over the joint venture
company.
As to the transferability of shares of invested capital, North Korean
statutes simply stipulate that the transfer of a part or the whole
portion of the investment can be made with the consent of the other
party to the joint venture. However, the Chinese statutes treat the
following issues: approval required from the examining and approval
authority; the other party's preemptory purchase right; and conditions
which allow the transfer of shares to a third party.
As far as the question of the duty to complete the payment of
investment is concerned, North Korean statutes are silent. As dis-
cussed earlier, China has adopted the 1988 Regulations dealing with
delay or partial delay in payment of the promised investment. At
the same time, Chinese statutes stipulate the required procedure for
the issuance of certificate for payments made.
The articles appearing in the 1984 law are repeated verbatim in its
implementing regulations in the North Korean text of 1984 JVL and
its 1985 JVL Regulations. One wonders why these repetitions are
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made in the implementing regulations, which were designed to sup-
plement the shortcomings of the basic law. At least two instances
should be noted:
1) For the debts incurred by a joint venture company in the course
of its operation, the parties to the joint venture shall assume
responsibility only for the portion of their respective investment. 229
2) A joint venture company shall not reduce its registered capital
investment. 0
Meanwhile, Chinese implementing regulations are free from repe-
tition. Article 5 of the 1979 JVL deals with capital investment. The
1983 JVL Regulations further elaborate on the subject by allocating
at least thirteen articles under the two chapter headings of: Form of
Organization and Registered Capital, and Ways of Contributing
Investment.231
The foregoing comparative presentation on the question of capital
investment is made to show how deficiently the North Korean statutes
prescribe the question as compared to the Chinese statutory scheme.
At the same time, China also needs further improvement in dealing
with the laws in this subject area. At least four issues are noteworthy.
First, when the parties to the joint venture fail to make the
investment payment subscribed, according to the time limit stipulated
by the joint venture contract, interest on arrears, caused by delay or
partial delay in payment, has to be made. If the contract is silent
concerning the rate of interest, the rate of interest will be the legal
rate. At present, however, China does not have a law to set the legal
interest rate.
The second issue relates to the protection of technological secrets.
The foreign investor who contributes industrial property or know-
how as the investment to the joint venture should be cautioned that
there is no Chinese law which protects patented technological knowl-
edge and know-how. The investor submits all the necessary docu-
ments, including the technology and know-how, as attachments to
the application to establish a joint venture. The problem arises if the
application is denied by the examining and approving authority. At
present there are no safeguards to protect already-revealed secrets of
technology and know-how. It seems appropriate to obligate the
229. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 22.
230. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 9; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note
24, at art. 21.
231. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 19-32.
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Chinese side of the joint venture to register intangible property rights
with the appropriate government agency, pursuant to currently ef-
fective industrial property legislation. 2 2 Until such measures are
incorporated into the legislation, protection could be stipulated in
the form of a letter of agreement at the initial stage of joint venture
negotiations.
The third issue concerns the valuation of shares in a transfer.
When one party to the joint venture intends to transfer his share of
the investment to the other party, the problem of how to value the
share in question arises. At present, Chinese law lacks valuation
standards which could be applicable to the proposed transfer of
shares. When the joint venture company is in good shape, the buyer
of the share expects the investment amount specified in the joint
venture contract. On the other hand, when the company is in bad
shape, the seller of the share would ask for the investment amount
appearing in the joint venture contract. It is difficult to assess the
value of the share, since it is conditioned by a number of variables.
Assume that initially the Japanese yen was offered, and subse-
quently was converted into U.S. dollars and Renminbi, which then
ultimately becomes the actual investment figures. If the foreign
partner wishes to transfer his share, valuation has to be made, taking
into consideration the fluctuation of foreign exchange. China needs
special legislation to set up objective standards to value the share of
the joint venture which is to be transferred.
The fourth issue relates to the nature of the joint venture company
with specific reference to making the investment payments. Under
the existing statutory provisions, the parties to the joint venture could
establish a joint venture company without making full payment of
the investment, by stipulating ways to make the promised payment
in the joint venture contract. 233 In the event one party defaults, the
party who fulfills the investment obligation is eligible to apply to the
original examining and approval authority234 for approval to dissolve
the joint venture company, and to secure the rights and obligations
232. See Lee, supra note 210, at 35-40; Woods, Trademark and Patent Law in the People's
Republic of China, 13 N.C.J. Ier'L L. & Com. Rio. 473 (1988); Marcuss & Watson, Technology
Transfer in the People's Republic of China: An Assessment, 15 SYRAcusE J. Ir'L L. & COM.
141 (1989).
233. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 11, 32.
234. Within one month following the expiration of a one month notice period to the other
party.
566
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of the party in default, as stipulated in the joint venture contract.2
5
The procedure resembles a bilateral relationship between parties to a
joint venture.
Where does the joint venture company stand in this process? Once
a joint venture is registered with the legally designated authority, it
acquires legal entity, and becomes an independent economic entity
as a self-governing body. Theoretically, the process should evolve
through the joint venture company, rather than party to party
settlement. This issue needs clarification. To what extent would China
give autonomous status to the joint venture company as a legal
entity?
V. BRIEF COMPARISON OF OTHER SELECTED AR.EAS
This section is designed to highlight the similarities and differences
which are reflected in North Korean and Chinese equity joint venture
legislation. The subjects selected for discussion are board of directors
and management; purchase of materials and sale of products; labor
management; foreign exchange control; audit and distribution; dis-
solution of the joint venture company; and settlement of disputes.
A. Board of Directors and Management
Both North Korean and Chinese laws provide for the establishment
within the joint venture company of a board of directors, with a
chairman and vice-chairman, and a management office with a com-
pany president and vice-president.2 36 The Board of Directors becomes
the highest decision-making body237 since there are no shareholders
meetings in the equity joint venture companies. The management
office is to engage in daily operation of the company under the
direction of the board of directors.13 Both countries show legislative
235. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 5, 7. See also Certain Regulations on
the Subscription of Capital by the Parties to Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises, approved by
the State Council, Dec. 30, 1987, jointly promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Jan. 1, 1988,
reprinted and translated in CHINA LAws FOR FoRaaiO BusmNiss 6-556 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987)
(concerning ratio of invested capital); PENDiEToN, INTE cTuAL PROPERTY LAw N T PEoprm's
REPuLruc OF CHINA: A GutmE TO PATams, TADEmAKS AND TECHNoL GY T1lNsFER (1989).
236. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 10; Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 6.
237. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 24; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 33.
238. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 12; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 30; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 38-40.
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inclination to provide the company with autonomy,239 but the extent
of autonomy is difficult to gauge due to government red tape.
Chinese statutes prescribe installment of a treasurer under the
supervision of the president, and an auditor under the supervision
of the board of directors and the president, in order to handle the
financial and accounting matters of the enterprise?' ° Chinese law
also requires that a registered accountant examine and certify the
certification of investment, annual fiscal reports, and fiscal reports
on liquidation. 2A' North Korean statutes are silent as to the appoint-
ment of a treasurer and auditor. The statute does require a financial
inspector, who is somewhat analogous to the Chinese registered
accountant. However, his role is not accurately prescribed. 242 Both
countries do not spell out specific qualifications required to be a
registered accountant or financial inspector, and whether they are to
be independent of management.
Since the board of directors is the highest decision-making body
within the joint venture company, it becomes an important matter
to decide who is to become chairman of the board. While North
Korean law is silent as to which side of the joint venture is to become
chairman and vice-chairman, Chinese law prescribes that a Chinese
citizen is to be appointed by the Chinese partner, and one or more
vice-chairmen are to be appointed by the foreign partner.23 Upon
close examination of the Chinese statutory scheme concerning powers
vested in the board chairman and the president of the company, it
is not altogether clear whose power prevails regarding decisions to
execute management operations. In particular, the scope of the
chairman's power is uncertain, except that he has the power to
represent the joint venture company legally,2 and to call and preside
over meetings.345
As far as a quorum for board meetings is concerned, North Korean
law is silent. However by failing to state whether all matters which
are dealt with by the board of directors are to be unanimous, it
implies that unanimous decisions are mandatory.2 46 On the other
239. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 24; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 33.
240. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 81.
241. Id. at arts. 32, 90.
242. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 20; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at arts. 55-56.
243. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 34.
244. Id. at art. 37.
245. Id. at art. 35.
246. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 28.
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hand, Chinese law requires a quorum of more than two-thirds of
the directors, and unanimous decisions are specifically required for
four selected matters.2
7
B. Purchase of Materials and Sale of Products
Both North Korean and Chinese laws prescribe the material pro-
curement necessary for the operation of the joint venture, and sale
of products produced by the operations of the company.U8 Procure-
ment of materials from domestic and foreign sources has to proceed
within the context of a centrally planned economy. Both countries
stipulate that in procuring materials to be used by the joint venture
company, if conditions are the same, first priority should be given
to purchases from domestic sources.349 Another similarity in the
legislation of both countries is the encouragement of the sale of
products abroad.
20
Unique in North Korean provisions is the requirement that in the
case in which materials are imported from abroad, the joint venture
company is to use North Korean official trade organizations, with
an exemption from paying a tariff, and waiver of an import permit.
251
At the same time, North Korean law requires payment of utility fees,
and purchase of insurance on joint venture company properties.
252
In comparison to North Korean legislation on material procurement
and sale of products, Chinese regulations are much more detailed
and address at least seven more areas: 1) supply route for the purchase
of materials in China;2 3 2) prices for materials purchased and services
needed in China; 254 3) the amount of materials needed for office and
daily operations of the joint venture;215 4) conditions and ways to
247. The four selected matters are: (1) amendment of articles of incorporation; (2) termination
and dissolution of the joint venture; (3) increase or assignment of the registered capital of the
joint venture; and (4) merger of the joint venture with other economic organizations. Chinese JVL
Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 36.
248. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 14-15; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at arts. 31-39; Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 14; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra
note 30, at arts. 54-68.
249. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 31; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 57.
250. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 33; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 60.
251. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at arts. 35-36.
252. Id. at arts. 38-39.
253. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 58.
254. Id. at art. 65.
255. Id. at art. 59.
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sell products on the Chinese market;26 5) ways to sell products on
the overseas market;27 6) determination of prices for products of the
joint venture on the Chinese and overseas markets;28 and 7) appli-
cation and approval of import and export licenses.Y9
In spite of these detailed regulations, Chinese legislation is not free
from further problems. At least three obvious problems can be noted.
They are: 1) price, quality, and delivery date of materials procured
in China; 2) price of machinery, equipment, and materials procured
abroad; and 3) price, quality, and buyer and seller of products on
sale abroad. These problems can be mitigated by stipulations in the
joint venture contract.
Another important issue in connection with the line of products
produced by the joint venture, is how to prohibit a similar product
line by another enterprise within the same geographical confines.
Since this issue concerns the basic nature of the joint venture enter-
prise, government legislation prohibiting the establishment of similar
enterprises, rather than a prohibiting stipulation in the joint venture
contract, is suggested.
Joint venture enterprises which fall into specified categories, by
the 1986 EFI Regulations, now have the right to purchase materials
independently and to import certain machinery, equipment, and raw
materials without receiving government approval and import li-
censes. 260 Furthermore, the 1986 EFI Regulations allow joint ventures
to sell and produce on the Chinese market without government
interference. 261
C. Labor Management
A joint venture is not only a joint investment by the foreign and
domestic partners, but also encompasses the joint management of
domestic personnel and labor. When the joint venture is established
in socialist countries such as North Korea and China, there are
complex problems which touch upon the nature of socialist society
and its traditional culture.2 2 Labor management is one of the most
256. Id. at art. 64.
257. Id. at art. 62.
258. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 66.
259. Id. at art. 63.
260. EFI Regulations, supra note 35, at arts. 13, 15.
261. Id. at art. 15.
262. As to the discussion of importance of culture to produce truly sustainable development,
see Packard-Winkler, Putting the Culture Back into Development, 13 FlEcTmR FoRUM Womuan
Air. 251, 252 (1989). See also PYE, THE MANDARw AND THM CADRE: CHNA'S PoLmcAL CuLTURE
(1988); GEERTZ, THE INT RPrTAiON oF CuLTURES (1973).
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difficult problems for the joint venture since it deals with human
relations. When a joint venture enterprise is established in an East
Asian socialist country such as North Korea or China, the foreign
partner to the joint venture has to deal with at least three discernible
categories of personnel: first, the higher echelon of domestic person-
nel;263 second, middle level supervisors and technicians; and third,
ordinary office staff and workers.
As far as higher echelon domestic personnel is concerned, their
conduct is directly related to their political motivation rather than to
economic gains. In a socialist society where every activity is controlled
by the state, the political status of a person is linked to his economic
well-being. The successful establishment of a joint venture by top
domestic managers may lead to attainment of their political goals.
Once the joint venture is established, they may work to accomplish
its success if it coincides with promotion of their political ambitions.
They may use the creation of the joint venture for its political gains.
However, once the interests of the joint venture conflict with the
promotion of their political ambitions they often choose the latter.
Every activity of the joint venture enterprise will become the instru-
ment of their political goals, and will be used effectively.
As to domestic middle level supervisors and technicians, they are
not obviously political, but are also not free from political control.
These technicians and middle level cadre are dispatched from the
domestic partners' parent enterprise. The dispatcher hopes that they
will learn foreign technology and management skills, and often uses
these persons to control workers in the joint venture enterprise. If
the company president represents the domestic partners, middle level
personnel will become the main body of support for the president's
programs. However, if the president is chosen by the foreign partners,
they will engage in surveillance of the president and other foreign
personnel, in cooperation with the domestic vice-president. Middle
level personnel are indeed in an insecure position, in that they may
be recalled to the parent enterprise with a word from top manage-
ment. If the domestic parent enterprise is separated from the joint
venture by geographical distance, supervisors and technicians will
wish to transfer their units to the locality in which the joint venture
is located, resulting in the need for the relocation of their family
members, employment of their spouses, and allocation of housing.
263. As to the reference to this category of personnel, see North Korean JVL Regulations,
supra note 24, at art. 28; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 14(5).
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Realization of these wishes depends on the whims of the domestic
partners to the joint venture enterprise, thus strictly limiting the scope
of their activities based on free will.
It will be difficult for foreign investors to expect loyalty from
domestic higher management personnel, and middle level supervisors
and technicians, toward the joint venture enterprise. It is also difficult
to expect them to identify with the joint venture entity. As far as
the ordinary office staff and workers are concerned, North Korea
and China have adopted legal regulations for labor management.
China's latest labor legislation 264 is more extensive and proscribes
explicit actions in joint venture companies. 265 North Korea does not
have similar legal measures.
In general, the joint venture laws of both countries dictate that
matters relating to employment and discharge of workers are to be
coordinated through state agencies. 2 6 A definite shortcoming of the
North Korean legislation is the lack of detailed guidelines for joint
venture labor management. China gives specific legal guidelines for
employment 267 and dismissal268 of workers and ordinary staff mem-
bers. Furthermore, any enterprise comes under the category specified
by the 1986 EFI Regulations and may exercise discretionary powers
to handle labor problems.26 9
North Korean law stipulates that matters relating to working hours,
rest periods, and other protections are to be implemented pursuant
to the labor laws and regulations.270 It is difficult to assess the
contents of this legislation due to unavailability of the text and
information related to their operations .27 Meanwhile, similar matters
264. Provisions for the Implementation of the Regulations on Labour Management in Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Labour and Personnel
Department of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 19, 1984 [hereinafter Chinese Provisions for
Implementing LM Regulations], reprinted and translated in CHIA LAws Fop FoRmoN BusuNmss
6-522 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). For a discussion of the numerous implementing regulations of
the 1986 EFI Regulations, see Comment, supra note 41, at 260-62 & n.16. The implementing
regulations are also evidenced by the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labour
Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State
Council, July 26, 1980 [hereinafter Chinese LM Regulations]; and the Chinese Provisions for
Implementing LM Regulations, supra.
265.. See Chinese Provisions for Implementing LM Regulations, supra note 264.
266. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at arts. 12, 40; Chinese LM Regulations,
supra note 264, at arts. 3-4.
267. Chinese LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 3.
268. Id. at art. 4.
269. Id. at art. 15.
270. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 41.
271. The Socialist Labor Code was enacted in 1978, but the text is not available. See STurDy
GurmE, supra note 5, at 18.
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in China are to be left to labor contract negotiations between the
joint venture and the labor union. 272
Both North Korea and China allow employment of aliens in the
joint venture enterprise. 273 While North Korea prescribes payment of
income tax on their earnings and permits them to remit abroad 60%
of their wages, 274 China requires the alien employees to pay an
additional 10% tax on profits remitted abroad.275 China demonstrates
more concern over limiting alien employment by stipulating that
hiring is to be based upon qualifications and needs. 276 North Korea
requires that all employees, including aliens, are to receive social
insurance and social security benefits. 277 China also requires that the
company provide labor insurance and welfare funds to employees.
278
While North Korean law is silent in addressing the question of
wages of joint venture employees, including executives, China requires
payment of approximately 120% to 150% of "real wages! 279 for
workers and staff members of state-owned enterprises of the same
trade in the same locality.2 0 However, wage standards, form of
wages paid, bonus, and subsidy systems are left for the board of
directors to decide. 28' Both countries emphasize the upgrading of
employees' professional and technical standards and the training of
workers.282
In China,28 3 lower level staff and workers in a joint venture
enterprise present continuous problems. 28 4 If these provisions are
observed, there seem to be no problems to reiterate.
272. Chinese LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 2.
273. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 42; Chinese LM Regulations, supra
note 264, at art. 12.
274. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 52.
275. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with
Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 4, adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress, promulgated Sept. 10, 1980, amended by the Second Session of the Standing
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, Sept. 2, 1983, reprinted and translated in
CHNA LAws FOR Foi- N Busnmmss 33-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
276. Chinese Provisions for Implementing LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 2.
277. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 44. The joint venture company is
required to contribute 7% of labor remuneration toward this purpose. In addition, employees are
required to contribute 1% of their pay toward social insurance.
278. Chinese Provisions for Implementing LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 13.
279. Chinese LM Regulations, supra note 264.
280. Id. at art. 8. As to an estimate of actual labor cost, see Comment, supra note 41, at 289
n.189.
281. Chinese LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 9. As to a discussion of the principle
of equal pay for domestic and foreign employees, see Comment, supra note 41, at 290.
282. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 43; Chinese Provisions for
Implementing LM Regulations, supra note 264, at art. 6.
283. Except for personnel in higher echelon and middle level supervisory positions in the joint
venture enterprise.
284. Solutions to these labor problems are prescribed by various provisions which have been
discussed earlier.
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However, there is the vexing issue of not granting Chinese citizens
the freedom to choose their own occupations. This seems to be
incompatible with the foundation of socialism. If the free labor
market, which is based upon freedom to choose one's occupation,
is not practiced in China, written labor legislation may run into
difficulties. Therefore, foreign partners to the joint venture are well
advised to conduct an in-depth study of the labor situation in China,
and to a large extent in North Korea, by examining existing statutory
provisions dealing with labor management. Unresolved and foresee-
able problems should be sorted out and stipulated in the joint venture
contract and articles of incorporation. Furthermore, companies re-
lying on these documents are required to adopt employment regula-
tions addressing procedures involving rewards for good performance,
punishment, and hiring and firing.
D. Foreign Exchange Control
Both the North Korean Won and the Chinese Renminbi are not
convertible into foreign exchange on the international money market.
The use of "hard" currency (internationally convertible foreign cur-
rency) vis-a-vis domestic currency by the joint venture companies is
the subject of government regulations. Examination of North Korean
and Chinese laws in the area of foreign exchange control reveals at
least five similar features, which are incorporated into their statutory
schemes. First, a joint venture company has the option of opening
both foreign exchange and domestic currency deposit accounts with
an officially designated bank. 285 Second, the officially designated
bank handles the supervision of receipts and expenditures. 2 6 Third,
interest rates which will be earned on the deposit accounts are set
and announced by the officially designated bank. 28 7 Fourth, the joint
venture company is allowed to open foreign exchange deposit ac-
counts abroad. 288 Fifth, the joint venture company is permitted to
apply to the officially designated bank for loans in foreign and
domestic currency.289
285. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 45; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 74.
286. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 45; Chinese JML Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 74.
287. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at'art. 46; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 74.
288. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 47; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 76.
289. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 49; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 78.
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Other than these similar statutory provisions, there is no available
North Korean legal information concerning foreign exchange control.
On the other hand, Chinese legislation on the subject is far more
extensive as compared to its North Korean counterpart. In 1983, the
Chinese statute mandated that "a joint venture shall, in general,
keep a balance between its foreign exchange income and expenses." 29°
The statute, which is designed to augment the 1980 Provisional
Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic
of China (FEC Regulations), 291 further prescribes that:
When a joint venture whose products are mainly sold on the
domestic market under its approved feasibility study report and
contract has an imbalance of foreign exchange income and expenses,
the imbalance shall be solved by the people's government of a
relevant province, an autonomous region or a municipality directly
under the central government or the department in charge under
the State Council from their own foreign exchange reserves; if
unable to be resolved, it shall be resolved through inclusion into
the plan after examination and approval by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade together with the State Planning
Commission of the People's Republic of China.
2
9
One task assigned to the joint venture is avoiding an imbalance
between its foreign exchange income and expenditure. Usual sources
for foreign exchange income under Chinese law include foreign capital
investment, 293 foreign loans,294 foreign currency earned by exportation
of the company's products,295 encouragement of deposits of foreign
currency by the foreign partner, 29 preferential tax treatment granted
on reinvestment of interest distribution received by the foreign part-
ner,297 preferred procurement of materials, fuel and equipment which
are needed for the operation of the joint venture from Chinese
sources, 298 and setting a lower usage fee on transferred technology. 219
Thus, secured foreign exchange is to be used for the purchase of
290. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 75.
291. Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China,
adopted by the Regular Session of the State Council, Dec. 5, 1980, promulgated Dec. 18, 1980
[hereinafter FEC Regulations], reprinted and translated in CHiNA LAWS FOR FoRmoN BusnumsS
8-550 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
292. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 75.
293. Id. at art. 21.
294. Id. at art. 78.
295. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 9.
296. Id. at art. 10.
297. Id. at art. 7.
298. Id. at art. 9.
299. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 46.
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raw materials, fuel, equipment and office supplies from abroad, °°
and for payment of transportation costs, royalties, transferred tech-
nology, wages for alien employees, and to allow foreign partners to
remit their share of interest distribution abroad.30I
Starting in April 1985, when the government foreign exchange
reserve drastically decreased and a foreign exchange crisis occurred,
the Chinese government had to adopt new measures to regulate
foreign exchange for the joint venture program.30 2 The purpose of
the 1986 statute is to encourage joint equity ventures and to promote
"the balance of their foreign exchange income and expenditure to
the advantage both of production management and repatriation of
legally earned profits by foreign joint ventures." 303 Important features
of the statute include: first, adjustment of foreign exchange imbalance
through a fund administered by either the central or the local
authorities;3°4 second, adjustment of the foreign exchange imbalance
by the state foreign exchange, if the products of the joint venture
sold on the domestic market meet specific conditions, and are in-
cluded in long term or annual plans for foreign exchange expenditure
established by the state agencies; 05 third, the possibility of adjusting
the foreign exchange imbalance if the products of the joint venture
could be sold in China, as import substitutions, for Chinese use;3as
fourth, the possibility of achieving the balance of foreign exchange
by purchasing export quality Chinese goods in Chinese currency, and
then selling those goods for foreign exchange on the international
market, with government approval;307 fifth, settlement of accounts in
foreign exchange by selling products to enterprises located outside
the designated areas that have the capacity to pay in foreign ex-
change;308 sixth, adjustment of foreign exchange among plural joint
ventures, financed by the same foreign partners; 309 and seventh,
300. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 9.
301. Id. at art. 10; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 46.
302. These measures appeared in the 1986 Regulations of the State Council Concerning the
Balance of Foreign Exchange Income and Expenditure by Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures,
promugated by the State Council, Jan. 15, 1986 [hereinafter FEB Regulations], reprinted and
translated in CHNA LAws FOR FoPamoN Busn4s 6-590 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
303. Id. at art. 1.
304. Id. at art. 3.
305. Id. at art. 4; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 61, 75.
306. FEB Regulations, supra note 302, at art. 5; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at
arts. 61, 75.
307. FEB Regulations, supra note 302, at art. 6.
308. Id. at art. 8.
309. Id. at art. 9.
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adjustment of foreign exchange imbalance by a joint venture rein-
vesting its share of Renminbi profits in other ventures in China,
which have the capacity to generate new and additional foreign
exchange earnings.310 After commenting on the above 1986 regula-
tions, one writer expressed his skepticism in the following words:
The FEB Regulations provide a legal basis for joint ventures with
foreign exchange imbalances to obtain relief. Because, however, the
relief is to come from government entities, Chinese trade corpora-
tions, or other Sino-foreign joint ventures, which are themselves
typically in need of foreign exchange, the practical application of
these provisions is suspect. It is probable that any attempt to get
these other entities within China to share their scarce foreign ex-
change with a joint venture through the FEB Regulations will
amount to little more than an attempt to get blood from the
proverbial stone."'
The effects of remedial measures for balancing foreign exchange
income and expenditure of a joint equity venture, appearing in the
1986 statute, will depend upon how well the Chinese government
maintains a comfortable amount of foreign exchange reserve, and
the foreign exchange available for the government agencies which
are concerned with the administration of joint venture programs in
China. Unless the Chinese foreign exchange situation substantially
improves, there is not much to expect in the way of government
assistance in balancing foreign exchange income and expenditure.
Therefore, when the establishment of a joint venture enterprise is
being negotiated, preferably at the stage of the feasibility study, the
foreign partners to the venture will be well advised to do an in-depth
study of how to generate foreign exchange and how to balance
foreign exchange income and expenses in light of the currently
effective statutory provisions.
E. Audit and Distribution
One of the important issues of the joint equity venture is how to
determine the amount of legally earned profits and to distribute the
profit among the parties to the venture. In order to reach the amount
to be distributed to the parties, based upon each party's share of
310. Id. at art. 10.
311. Comment, supra note 41, at 297. See also UN=eD NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CoRPoRATIoNs, FOREIGN DIRECT lIwEs m= 'nm PaoPLE's REPuBuIC oF CHINA 76-79, 90-92
(1988).
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investment, it is necessary to go through such processes as auditing,
payment of taxes, and setting aside of required funds.
Both North Korea and China prescribe the legal regulations for
auditing and for managerial activities of the joint equity venture.
3 12
There are at least three common features which appear in North
Korean and Chinese statutory provisions. First, designation of the
responsible person to audit the company's records;313 second, the
auditing year (January 1 through December 31);114 and third, deter-
mination of net income of the joint venture company. 315
The extent of North Korea's statutory regulations on auditing stop
here. On the other hand, China treats at least six more issues. First,
determination of the method of accounting; 316 second, determination
of the standard currency in keeping accounts; 3 7 third, Chinese lan-
guage requirement, in principle, in preparing vouchers, accounting
records, statistics, and reports; 38 fourth, recording the procedure
dealing with currency exchange;3 9 fifth, submission of annual fiscal
reports to the designated government agencies; 320 and sixth, certifi-
cation of the fiscal report by an accountant registered in China. 32'
312. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 18, 20-21; North Korean JVL Regulations,
supra note 24, at arts. 53-60; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 89-90. See also
The Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Ministry of Finance of The People's Republic of
China, Mar. 4, 1985 [hereinafter Accounting Regulations], reprinted and translated in CHINA LAWS
FOR FoREmo Busness 35-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
313. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at arts. 12-15; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at arts. 55-56; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 82.
314. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 53; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art 83.
315. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 21; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30,
at art. 87.
316. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 84. The joint venture is required to use
the internationally adopted accrual basis and the debit and credit accounting system in their work.
317. Id. at art. 85. The joint venture must adopt Renminbi as the standard currency. However,
on keeping accounts, another currency may be used through consent by the parties involved.
318. Id. at art. 84. All accounting documents must be written in Chinese. However, a foreign
language may be used concurrently with the mutual consent of the parties to the joint venture.
319. Id. at art. 86. In addition to the use of standard currency to record accounts, joint
ventures should also record accounts in currencies actually used in payments and receipts, if such
currencies are inconsistent with the standard currency, in recording accounts. Joint ventures using
foreign currency in accounting must work out a statement of accounts in Renminbi equivalents in
addition to those in the foreign currency.
320. Id. at art. 89. The joint venture must submit quarterly and annual fiscal reports to the
parties to the joint venture, the local tax authorities, the department in charge of the joint venture,
and the financial department at the same level as those departments. Also, a copy of the annual
fiscal reports must be submitted to the original examination and approval authority.
321. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 90. See also Accounting Regulations,
supra note 312, at art. 65. The accounting reports are considered valid only after being examined
by an accountant registered in China.
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Chinese law requires that a formulated auditing scheme of the
joint venture, which is incorporated into the joint venture contract,
is to be filed with local financial departments and tax authorities.
3 "
Furthermore, joint venture accounting has to comply with the 1985
Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 23 An examination
of existing Chinese regulations on auditing shows that there seems
to be no safety valve created to check on the company president,
particularly if he is a Chinese national.312 The company president
uses a treasurer to assist him and an auditor is appointed by the
joint venture. 32- However, there is no rule for any member of the
board of directors to investigate the detailed fiscal situation of the
company or to examine the accounting documents. To this extent,
such a rule should be written into the joint venture contract, in order
to check on the company president.
The North Korean statutes mandate the creation of a reserve fund
to be contributed at 5% of the annual net income, until the contri-
bution totals 25% of the joint venture's total registered capital.
326 It
is not clear whether the contribution to the reserve fund is to be
estimated on net income before or after taxes. 327 Chinese law also
requires the establishment of a reserve fund, but does not mandate
that a specific percent of net profits be contributed to the fund.
32S
The purpose of the reserve fund, as with North Korean law,329 is to
supplement losses of the joint venture, thus prohibiting the distri-
bution of profits unless losses of previous years have been made
up.330 Both North Korean and Chinese law allow transfer of the
reserve fund to registered capital investment.
331
In addition to the establishment of a mandatory reserve fund, both
North Korean and Chinese law prescribe creation of a bonus and
322. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 80.
323. Accounting Regulations, supra note 312, at art. 1. Article 1 states in pertinent part that
"the present regulations are formulated to strengthen the accounting work of joint ventures...
Id.
324. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 81.
325. Id. at art. 82.
326. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 19; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 58.
327. Kim, supra note 21, at 192. As to the discussion of a tax holiday for the joint venture,
and an exemption or reduction of its income tax, see id. at 193.
328. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 87. It is assumed that the joint venture
contract determines the specific percentage.
329. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 58.
330. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 87-88.
331. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 58; Chinese JVL, supra note 29,
at art. 7; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 87.
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welfare fund for employees, and an expansion and development
fund.332 Both laws further prescribe that the board of directors
determine the proportion and allocation of the three funds.333 It is
assumed that the proportion of contribution to these funds could be
determined by one lump sum, or separately. As far as the bonus and
welfare fund for employees (particularly welfare) is concerned, that
amount is also subject to income tax.334 However, this rule seems
inappropriate, since the fund supplements the welfare of the workers,
which comes under state responsibility.
After the equity joint venture has met its tax obligations and its
contributions to the stipulated funds, North Korean and Chinese law
authorize that the profits are to be distributed among the parties
according to their proportional ownership of registered capital.3 35
North Korean law is silent as to restrictions, including tax conse-
quences, on repatriated earnings. 3 6 In China, distributed profits are
subject to income tax; 337 however, reinvestment of the profits in
China may result in a rebate on that portion of income tax already
paid.338 Chinese law encourages the foreign party to deposit with the
Bank of China any part of the foreign exchange which he is entitled
to remit abroad.339
F. Dissolution of the Joint Venture Company
Parties to the joint venture usually stipulate questions involving
dissolution of the joint venture company within the scope of the
joint venture contract. However, stipulated terms in the contract are
subject to the governmental regulations of the host country.
Both North Korean and Chinese legislation regulate three aspects
of the dissolution of the joint venture 4.3 4 First, dissolution by agree-
332. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 59; Chinese JVL, supra note 29,
at art. 7; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 87.
333. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 59; Chinese JyL, supra note 29,
at art. 7; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 87.
334. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 7. In China, these funds are deducted from the after
tax net profit.
335. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 60; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 87.
336. North Korean JVL, supra note. 21, at art. 22; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 60.
337. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 7.
338. Id. For a discussion of this issue, see Comment, An Analysis of Foreign Investment in
the People's Republic of China in the Aftermath of the Sino-U.S. Tax Agreement, 1 TaRSNAT'L
LAw. 547, 581 (1988).
339. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 10.
340. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 23; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 61; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 100-101.
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ment;341 second, premature dissolution; 42 and third, dissolution pro-
cedures.1
43
According to both North Korean and Chinese law, duration of the
joint venture is determined by the parties to the joint venture.3 44 As
to the period of duration of the joint venture, North Korean law is
silent. However, Chinese law expects an ordinary period ranging
from ten to thirty years, depending upon the nature of the business
and its projects.3 45 Both countries leave the option of going beyond
the stipulated period by complying with the six month initiation
period by government approval and registration requirements. 46
With reference to the causes of premature dissolution, North
Korean and Chinese law share three general common features: first,
continuous, heavy losses; 347 second, failure to meet obligations stip-
ulated by either party; 34 and third, heavy losses due to force ma-
jeure.349 Furthermore, China treats two more causes for involuntary
dissolution: first, failure to meet the desired objectives with no further
prospects of improvement; 30 and second, the occurrence of other
reasons for dissolution, stipulated by the parties to 'the joint ven-
ture.351 Both North Korean and Chinese law dictate that board
appointed liquidators, who are responsible to the board of directors,
report liquidation proceedings to the designated government agencies,
make final asset distribution based upon pro-rata share of the reg-
istered capital investment, and notify the registration agency when
the liquidation is complete. 52 At the same time, China prescribes
341. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 24; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 30, at art. 62; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 101.
342. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 24; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 62; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 102.
343. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 25; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at arts. 63-67; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at arts. 103-108.
344. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 23; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 61; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 100.
345. But see Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 100 (period of the joint venture
may be extended beyond 50 years).
346. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 23; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 61; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 101.
347. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 62; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 102.
348. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 62; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 102.
349. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 62; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at art. 102. As to the Chinese concept of force majeure, see Chan, In the Aftermath
of Tiananmen Square, INT'L FiN. L. Ray. 13 (August 1989).
350. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 102.
351. Id.
352. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at arts. 63-67; Chinese JVL Regulations,
supra note 30, at arts. 103-107.
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further provisions. These are as follows: preferred persons to be
liquidators;353 priority payment for expenses involving liquidation,
including remuneration for the liquidators;3 4 liquidators' liability to
sue and be sued;355 and Chinese participant to the joint venture to
become custodian of the dissolution-related documents when the
dissolution is complete.
35 6
G. Settlement of Disputes
The North Korean approach to settle "differing opinions arising
in the course of the operation of the joint venture company" is to
resort to conciliation first. 357 If the dispute is not settled, the next
step is to seek deliberation and settlement "by a court or by a trade
arbitration organ of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.' '358
Since statutes use the words "by a court or by a trade arbitration
organ," it is surmised that, as far as the second step of the dispute
settlement is concerned, parties to the dispute seem to have a choice
of either court litigation or arbitration when the first step fails. It is
unclear to what extent North Korean legislation recognizes the im-
portance of arbitration in the settlement of disputes.
When the dispute is litigated in court, the trial is conducted in
accordance with civil litigation procedures, and foreign and domestic
parties enjoy equal procedural rights. 359 When arbitration is used,
parties must follow the established procedures on the examination of
foreign arbitration cases, with the option of nominating arbitrators
who are not listed in the official roster of arbitrators. 360 Parties are
allowed to submit disputes to the arbitration organ of a third country,
pursuant to the agreement of the parties to the joint venture. 361 North
Korean statutes are silent as to the basis of having arbitration. The
353. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 104. Members of the liquidation committee
are usually selected from among the directors of the joint venture. Alternatively, the joint venture
may invite accountants or lawyers registered in China to do the job. The liquidation committee
may be supervised by the examination and approval authority. Id.
354. Id. The liquidation committee's compensation and the costs of liquidation are given top
priority from the existing assets of the joint venture. Id.
355. Id. at art. 105.
356. Id. at art. 108.
357. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 26; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 68.
358. North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 26; North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 68.
359. North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 70.
360. Id. at art. 69.
361. Id. at art. 71.
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usual basis would be agreement between the parties to the joint
venture. 62
On the other hand, Chinese legislation on the question of dispute
settlement is more transparent as compared to its North Korean
counterpart. It clearly establishes a three-step approach to resolve
"disputes arising over the interpretation or execution of an agree-
ment, contract or articles of incorporation between the parties to a
joint venture. ' 363 As a first step, the preferable settlement of disputes
is to deploy friendly consultation or conciliation.3 6 Settlement of
disputes by way of amicable consultation or conciliation is the
product of a uniquely East Asian legal culture.3 6 This method of
dispute settlement does not appear in the joint venture laws of other
socialist countries, including the 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law.
3 66
Disputes which can not be settled through these means may be settled
through arbitration.3 67 Litigation is typically considered as the last
resort.
3 68
The parties to the joint venture seek arbitration pursuant to a
written agreement. 369 Arbitration may be conducted pursuant to the
1988 Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission. 370 The 1988 statute prescribes
composition of an arbitration panel, hearings, and awards. 371 The
parties may consent to arbitration in a third country.372 Under an
362. A text of the above mentioned procedural rules on civil litigation and arbitration is not
available, thus precluding further discussion of the subject matter. See STUDY GuiDE, supra note
5, at 18.
363. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 14; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
110.
364. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 14; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
109.
365. Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, supra note 4, at 1432.
366. As to the discussion of dispute settlement under the 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law, see
Osakwe, The Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy: A Clinical Examination of
the Soviet Joint Venture Law of 1987, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 64-66 (1989) [hereinafter
Osakwe]; Hertzsfeld, Applicable Law and Dispute Settlement in Soviet Joint Ventures, 3 ICSID
REv. 249 (1988).
367. Chinese JVL, supra note 29, at art. 14; Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art.
109.
368. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 109.
369. Id. at art. 111.
370. Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic Trade and Arbitration
Commission, adopted by the Third Session of the First Meeting of the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade, Sept. 12, 1988 [hereinafter Arbitration Provisions], reprinted
and translated in CannA LAWS FOR FoRmoN Busum 10-505 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
371. Id. at arts. 2-4.
372. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 110. As to the arbitral sites in third
country arbitration, e.g., Sweden and Hong Kong, see Comment, "Talking Disputes into Har-
mony": China Approaches International Arbitration, 4 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 137, 162-66
(1989).
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ordinary situation, parties to the joint venture would choose one of
three forums: China, a third country, or the defendant's country. 373
The arbitration award is final and binding on both sides.374 China is
a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.3 75 Therefore, foreign
arbitral awards can be executed in China.
3 76
In the absence of a written arbitration agreement between the
parties to the joint venture, the dispute is to be litigated before the
Chinese people's court, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.3 7
According to the 1981 Foreign Economic Contract Law, "Contracts
signed between the Chinese and overseas parties performed within
the territory of China in the form of joint venture" are to be
governed by Chinese law. 378 Under existing statutes, MOFERT has
the power to interpret JVL regulations.3 79 It seems that this ministerial
power is far-reaching to resolve "disputes arising over the interpre-
tation or execution of an agreement, contract or articles of incor-
poration of parties to a joint venture. ' 380 Very little room is left for
the judiciary to intervene in disputes related to joint ventures.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has become clear through a comparison of ten elements of the
North Korean and Chinese joint equity venture legislation that current
373. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 110; Comment, supra note 372, at 162-
66.
374. Arbitration Provisions, supra note 370, at art. 36. Article 193 of the Chinese Code of
Civil Procedure for Trial Implementation prescribes that "[w]here an award has already been
rendered by an arbitral board of the People's Republic of China having responsibility for arbitrating
disputes involving foreign nationals, the parties may not institute legal proceedings in a people's
court." Code of Civil Procedure for Trial Implementation, adopted by the Twenty Second Session
of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, Mar. 8, 1982, effective from
Oct. 1, 1982 [hereinafter CCP for Trial Implementation], reprinted and translated in CHINA LAWS
FOR FoRaIGN Busmrs 19-200 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1988).
375. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, acceded to with reservations by the People's Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1986, 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. China's accession to the New York Convention was
made by the Eighteenth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress.
376. Id.
377. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 111; CCP for Trial Implementation,
supra note 374, at art. 192.
378. FECL, supra note 89, at art. 5. The 1986 General Principles of Civil Law dictate that a
contract is governed by the principle of party autonomy, and, in the absence of choice, the law
of the place with closest contact to the contract governs. See General Civil Principles of PRC,
supra note 60, at art. 145. Reparation for injuries caused by torts is governed by lex loci delicto
commissi; but torts should be recognized in China. Id. at art. 146.
379. Chinese JVL Regulations, supra note 30, at art. 117.
380. Id.
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North Korean equity venture enactments require further improve-
ment. At the same time, this study has shown that Chinese legislation
on joint equity ventures is also far from being technically perfect, in
spite of the remarkable efforts which have been made up until June
1989 to establish a legal framework to encourage joint venture
activities.
It has also become apparent through this study that a transparency
of laws in North Korea is desired. As is pointed out throughout this
study, the availability of a legal text, which should be part of the
North Korean legal infrastructure, seems to be limited and restricted.
It must be emphasized here that as a result of the lack of a transparent
legal structure, inducement of investment from non-socialist countries
may run into difficulties. Ordinarily, foreign investors would consider
transparency of laws as of primordial importance in order to assess
their rights and liabilities in the event of materialization of a joint
venture project.
Transparent laws require refined legislative draftsmanship. As dis-
cussed earlier in connection with capital investment, the articles
appearing in the 1984 North Korean JVL are repeated verbatim in
the 1985 JVL Regulations. There are also similar instances of ver-
batim repetition throughout the 1984 and 1985 statutes. 81 Since
implementing regulations are designed to supplement the shortcom-
ings of the basic law, the verbatim repetition which appeared in the
basic law and then in the implementing regulations is redundant and
totally unnecessary.
Foreign direct involvement by means of joint equity venture wil
continue to play an important role within the framework of the state-
planned North Korean economy. Needless to say, joint equity venture
programs will grow larger through more attractive incentives to the
381. See North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 1(2), and North Korean JVL Regulations,
supra note 24, at art. 2; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 5, and North Korean JVL
Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 9; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 8(2), and North
Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 23; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art.
10, and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 24; North Korean JVL, supra note
21, at art. 12, and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 30; North Korean JVL,
supra note 21, at art. 13(1), and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 47; North
Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 18, and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at
art. 53; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 19, and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra
note 24, at art. 58; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 21, and North Korean JVL
Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 57; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art. 23, and North
Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 61; North Korean JVL, supra note 21, at art.
26(1), and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 68; North Korean JVL, supra
note 21, at art. 26(3), and North Korean JVL Regulations, supra note 24, at art. 71.
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non-socialist investors. In this regard, North Korea is competing with
other developing Asian countries, which are actively seeking outside
investment. As far as labor intensive enterprises are concerned, North
Korea definitely provides an advantage, since subsidies for food and
basic consumer goods keep wages low. In addition, as elaborated
elsewhere, North Korea offers numerous incentives for foreign inves-
tors under the current statutes.382 A possible course for North Korean
actions to induce foreign investment include market strategies, crea-
tion of a free trade zone, and active governmental participation in
international public financial institutions.3 3 In addition, it would be
worth considering investment protection treaties with non-socialist
countries, by utilizing Chinese experience as discussed earlier, and by
possibly examining current debate on a Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency. 384
According to a recent report, $2 billion has been invested through
joint venture programs in North Korea from abroad, mainly by
socialist countries and Korean residents in Japan. 3 5 The same report
notes two recent instances of Korean Americans who made arrange-
ments to invest in North Korea. 386
A recent innovation which North Korea has taken is the establish-
ment of a Ministry of Joint Venture Industry. 817 Undoubtedly, the
new ministry faces challenging tasks. Its immediate task should be
to create a viable legal infrastructure to lessen the anxiety of pro-
spective foreign. investors. Another ministerial task, following the
Chinese experience, may be to undertake to publish sample models
of joint venture contracts and articles of incorporation.
In 1987, the USSR joined a group of Eastern block countries to
actively seek non-socialist capital by enacting joint equity venture
legislation.38 It is still too early to tell how the new Soviet legislation
on joint ventures will influence North Korean enactments on the
subject. As evidenced in this study, North Korea has cautiously
382. Kim, supra note 21, at 198-201.
383. Id. at 201-04.
384. See Berger, The New Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Globalizing the Invest-
ment Insurance Approach Toward Development, 15 SmRACuSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 13 (1988).
385. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, at E3, col. 2.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. As to the English text of the 1987 statute, see Osakwe, supra note 366, at 1-125;
Eichmann, Joint Ventures in Hungary: A Model for Socialist States, 20 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus.
257 (1988). As to a discussion of joint venture policies of the socialist countries of eastern Europe,
see U. N. CaNr=E ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., JOINT VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECON OnC
Co-OPERATIoNs 30-47 (1988).
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borrowed numerous features of Chinese legislation on joint equity
ventures. In the midst of debate on perestroika, glasnost, and market
socialism, particularly in the Eastern European countries and the
emergence of the increased importance of East Asia in the world
economy, this political and economic wind may add new dimensions
to joint equity venture legislation. It will be interesting to observe
how North Korea can successfully reconcile the concept of joint
equity venture by non-socialist and domestic partners with Chuche
Thought.

